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ABSTRACT—The doctrine of viewpoint neutrality is central to First 
Amendment jurisprudence. It requires the state to not treat speech 
differently based on a speaker’s political or philosophical opinions. The 
doctrine has recently come under attack, however, for protecting hate 
speech and other views inimical to liberal democracy. Critics note that 
most democracies outside of the United States have rejected the doctrine of 
viewpoint neutrality, while still endorsing a right to free speech. In stark 
contrast to these critics, Martin Redish has offered a clear and robust 
defense of this doctrine, which he grounds in an account of “epistemic 
humility.” 
In contrast to these positions, my theory of “value democracy” 
suggests a new approach to viewpoint neutrality. I suggest the doctrine 
rightly protects rights of people to make up their minds and speak while 
keeping them free from the threat of coercive punishment. I add, however, 
that the state has an obligation to use its expressive capacities to defend the 
values that underlie these rights and to criticize expressions of hate that 
oppose them. 
Value democracy therefore highlights two aspects of free speech. First, 
it develops an account of how the values of free and equal citizenship—
autonomy and equal respect—ground the doctrine of viewpoint neutrality. 
To respect the equal autonomy of citizens, the state should not coercively 
ban hate speech. Second, it articulates an expressive role for the state in 
defending the values of free and equal citizenship. The state should defend 
these values by criticizing hate speech and other viewpoints that seek to 
undermine the freedom and equality of citizens. Using its expressive 
capacity, the state can respect rights at the same time that it checks the 
spread of illiberal viewpoints, thus avoiding complicity with the hate 
 
†  This Essay draws from COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS, WHAT SHOULD IT 
SAY? HOW DEMOCRACIES CAN PROTECT EXPRESSION AND PROMOTE EQUALITY (2012). Parts I and II 
draw additionally from a related article, Corey Brettschneider, When the State Speaks, What Should It 
Say? The Dilemmas of Freedom of Expression and Democratic Persuasion, 8 PERSP. ON POL. 1005 
(2010). 
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speech it protects. I suggest, moreover, how value democracy can help us 
to rethink the First Amendment doctrines of the “limited public forum” and 
“state speech,” as presented in Bob Jones University v. United States, Rust 
v. Sullivan, National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, and Christian Legal 
Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of the 
Law v. Martinez. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The doctrine of viewpoint neutrality is central to First Amendment 
jurisprudence.1 It requires the state to not treat speech differently based on 
a speaker’s political or philosophical opinions. The doctrine has recently 
come under attack, however, for protecting hate speech and other views 
inimical to liberal democracy. Critics point out that most democracies 
outside of the United States have rejected the doctrine of viewpoint 
neutrality while still endorsing a right to free speech. These democracies 
admit the importance of respecting diverse political and philosophical 
opinions, but they do not give wholesale protection to viewpoints that 
attack the freedom and equality of citizens. For example, Germany bans 
fascist speech, Holocaust denial, and the advocacy of racism under its 
principle of “militant democracy.”2 Similarly, France prohibits speech that 
disparages racial, ethnic, or religious groups.3 Canada, in the R. v. Keegstra 
case, prosecuted a teacher for imparting racist views during a classroom 
lesson.4 In contrast, under the American doctrine of viewpoint neutrality, 
such government opposition to hate speech would not pass constitutional 
muster. 
Following the example of other democracies, several legal scholars in 
the United States have urged the Court to reconsider viewpoint neutrality. 
Jeremy Waldron’s recent book, The Harm in Hate Speech, rejects the 
doctrine for allowing minority groups to be exposed to discrimination and 
humiliation, undermining their equal inclusion in society.5 Other thinkers, 
like Catharine MacKinnon and Charles Lawrence, believe that viewpoint 
 
1 For discussions of the doctrine of viewpoint neutrality as core to the meaning of First Amendment 
free speech protection, see MARTIN H. REDISH, THE ADVERSARY FIRST AMENDMENT (forthcoming 
2013). I focus later in this Essay on discussions of Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), and National 
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
2 See ERIK BLEICH, THE FREEDOM TO BE RACIST? 97‒105 (2011); see also Adam Liptak, Outside 
U.S., Hate Speech Can Be Costly: Rejecting the Sweep of the First Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 
2008, at A1 (describing differences in the way the United States and other countries, such as Canada 
and Germany, treat potentially offensive speech). 
3 See BLEICH, supra note 2, at 17–18, 40. 
4 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can.). 
5 JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH (2012). 
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neutrality is inconsistent with the Constitution’s commitment to the equal 
protection of the law.6 
In stark contrast to these critics, Martin Redish has offered a clear and 
robust defense of the doctrine of viewpoint neutrality. As he explains in his 
important forthcoming book, The Adversary First Amendment: Free 
Expression and the Foundations of American Democracy, there are two 
reasons to uphold viewpoint neutrality as a central constitutional and First 
Amendment value.7 The first reason is to respect autonomy, defined as 
individual choice; viewpoint neutrality protects the ability of individuals to 
choose their own opinions. A second reason for viewpoint neutrality is 
“epistemic humility,” or the belief that the state must be modest and refrain 
from endorsing any particular substantive values. 
In this Essay, I aim to defend a modified form of viewpoint neutrality. 
I agree with Redish that individual autonomy is fundamental to 
understanding the doctrine of viewpoint neutrality and the right of free 
speech more generally. For the state to respect individual autonomy, it 
should allow citizens to make up their minds and speak about politics 
without the threat of punishment. I add that the ideal of autonomy should 
be complemented by the value of equal respect. The state upholds equal 
respect of individuals when it does not discriminate on the basis of their 
race, gender, or sexual orientation. I refer to autonomy and equal respect as 
the values of “free and equal citizenship,” since they are among the core 
values of liberal democracy.8 
Unlike Redish, however, I reject epistemic humility’s attempt to avoid 
endorsing any substantive values. I argue that viewpoint neutrality in rights 
against coercion should be grounded in a set of core constitutional values, 
in particular equal respect and autonomy, and not epistemic humility. 
Redish notes that the Court took an approach that seems to favor epistemic 
humility when it claimed that, in regards to the First Amendment, “there is 
no such thing as a false idea.”9 But I will argue that autonomy and equal 
respect are substantive values. The substantive nature of these values, 
which underlie viewpoint neutrality, is shown in how they conflict with 
opposing substantive viewpoints that advocate treating minorities 
unequally or depriving them of their autonomy. Interpreters of the First 
Amendment must therefore choose between a commitment to epistemic 
 
6 See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 71–73 (1993); Charles R. Lawrence III, If 
He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, in WORDS THAT WOUND 53, 57–58 
(Mari J. Matsuda et al. eds., 1993).  
7 See REDISH, supra note 1. 
8 On free and equal citizenship, see JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 29‒35 (expanded ed. 
2005). 
9 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974); see also REDISH, supra note 1, ch. 6 
(citing Gertz for the proposition that the Court favors epistemic humility as a justification for viewpoint 
neutrality). 
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humility, which requires the state to refrain from endorsing any substantive 
values, and a substantive ideal of free and equal citizenship. 
Faced with this choice, why should we choose autonomy 
complemented by equal respect and not epistemic humility? The problem 
with epistemic humility is that it fails to respond to an important challenge 
from the critics of viewpoint neutrality—the “paradox of rights.”10 The 
paradox is that the right of free speech protects the ability of all individuals 
to express their own opinions without the threat of state coercion. However, 
some individuals might use their right of free speech to attack rights or 
their equal application to all citizens. Liberal democracies that practice 
epistemic humility risk being unable to defend rights from being 
undermined by those who reject the central commitments of liberal 
democracy itself. The paradox of rights thus captures the common concern 
that liberal democracy “cannot take [its] own side in an argument,”11 even 
against hateful or discriminatory viewpoints. 
Epistemic humility faces two problems in addressing the paradox of 
rights. First, epistemic humility leaves the state incapable of defending 
liberal democracy. Hateful ideologies might then spread unchecked, 
undermining the protection of rights. Second, the state might be seen as 
being complicit in hateful or discriminatory speech that it protects but does 
not criticize. The state’s neutrality in extending the right of free speech to 
hateful viewpoints might then be mistaken for its neutrality towards the 
discriminatory values expressed by those viewpoints. Both of these 
problems with epistemic humility stem from its refusal to allow the state to 
endorse any substantive values. 
To answer the challenge from the paradox of rights, I argue that we 
must justify the doctrine of viewpoint neutrality using a set of substantive, 
non-neutral values, such as autonomy and equal respect. On my account, 
the state should find a way to defend these substantive values against 
viewpoints that challenge the basic ideal of free and equal citizenship. 
Hateful and discriminatory viewpoints should be viewed as “false” under 
the Constitution and criticized as such. The question, then, is how to defend 
the substantive values of autonomy and equal respect—thereby addressing 
the paradox of rights—while still upholding viewpoint neutrality in rights 
against coercion. 
I propose that two features of what I call “value democracy” can 
answer the paradox of rights. First, I provide an account of how the 
doctrine of viewpoint neutrality is grounded in deeper, non-neutral, 
substantive values. Second, I argue that a liberal democratic state that 
embraces the doctrine of viewpoint neutrality must find a way to defend the 
reasons for rights at the same time it upholds the right of free speech. The 
 
10 WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY 98 (1995). 
11 BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note †, at 6. 
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state can best accomplish this by relying on its expressive and not its 
coercive capacities. On my account, the doctrine of viewpoint neutrality 
rightly protects all viewpoints from coercive sanction, but such protection 
should be complemented by a robust role for the state in promoting the 
values of autonomy and equal respect. These values form the “reasons for 
rights” that justify why the state protects the right of free speech. I argue 
that the state should use its expressive capacities, including court opinions, 
public holidays, and government subsidies, to criticize the hateful and 
discriminatory speech that it simultaneously protects from coercive 
sanction. I call this role for the state in defending the values of liberal 
democracy “democratic persuasion” to emphasize the importance of the 
state using its expressive and not its coercive capacities. The state should 
be viewpoint neutral in rights against coercion, but it should not be neutral 
in its own speech. 
In Part I, I begin by articulating a theory of how the substantive 
values, or reasons for rights, underlie the doctrine of viewpoint neutrality. I 
pursue this task by closely analyzing Virginia v. Black. In Part II, I go on to 
offer an account of the state speech doctrine as being central to the state’s 
ability to articulate the reasons for rights. I suggest why the state speech 
doctrine would have been a better frame for the Court’s decision in 
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez.12 I criticize the Court’s reasoning in 
the Christian Legal Society case, although I defend its conclusion and 
central holding. I am also critical of the Court’s approach to viewpoint 
neutrality in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, but here too I 
support its conclusion and general holding.13 Although I use these cases to 
emphasize the importance of allowing the state to promote the values of 
free and equal citizenship, I add that state speech should be subject to 
substantive limits. In particular, I criticize the Court’s decision in Rust v. 
Sullivan for undermining the entitlement of citizens to know their basic 
rights.14 
In sum, I aim to highlight two expressive aspects of free speech. First, 
I develop an account of how the values of free and equal citizenship—
autonomy and equal respect—ground the doctrine of viewpoint neutrality. 
To respect the equal autonomy of citizens, the state should not coercively 
ban hate speech. A coercive ban would restrict the autonomy of citizens to 
make up their minds and express their opinions. Second, I articulate an 
expressive role for the state in defending the values of free and equal 
citizenship. The state should not be neutral in regard to autonomy and equal 
respect. Rather, it should defend these values for all citizens in its 
expressive capacity. The state should be free to criticize hate speech and 
 
12 Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. 
Ct. 2971 (2010). 
13 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
14 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
107:603 (2013) Value Democracy as the Basis for Viewpoint Neutrality 
609 
other viewpoints that seek to undermine the freedom and equality of 
citizens. This expressive role for the state in defending the values of free 
and equal citizenship allows it to respond to the paradox of rights. Using its 
expressive capacity, the state can respect rights at the same time that it 
checks the spread of illiberal viewpoints and avoids complicity with the 
hate speech it protects. 
I. NEUTRALITY AND COERCION 
In this Part, I aim to demonstrate that viewpoint neutrality itself is 
theoretically grounded in the non-neutral democratic value of free and 
equal citizenship. Viewpoint neutrality prohibits bans on the expression of 
viewpoints based on their substantive message. For instance, while the 
doctrine of viewpoint neutrality would not protect the atrocities committed 
by the Nazis, it would protect the right to express Nazi ideology. It is often 
thought that the doctrine is protective of “hate speech,” but it is worth 
clarifying precisely what kind of “hate speech” is protected under the 
doctrine of viewpoint neutrality. Often, the term is used to refer to a variety 
of speech that can range from threats to the expression of viewpoints. 
Although viewpoint neutrality requires protecting the right to express 
certain hateful viewpoints, it does not require the protection of threats. The 
Supreme Court recently helped to clarify this distinction between protected 
expression and unprotected threats in Virginia v. Black by distinguishing 
between two kinds of cross burning.15 The Court ruled that an act of cross 
burning could be prohibited if it threatened particular individuals and 
constituted “intent to intimidate.”16 Justice O’Connor suggested in her 
opinion that it is consistent with the First Amendment to outlaw threats, 
even if they are based on a specific viewpoint. For example, one of the 
incidents considered in the case involved a cross that was burned on a 
family’s yard. O’Connor’s opinion suggested why this type of cross 
burning could qualify as a threat, which would allow it to be legitimately 
outlawed consistent with the protection of free speech. Her opinion sought 
to distinguish this type of cross burning from cross burnings that were not 
threats and were thus protected by the First Amendment.17 O’Connor’s 
opinion could be interpreted as carving out an exception to the doctrine of 
viewpoint neutrality when she recognized that threats could be prohibited, 
even if they were also expressive. 
While Justice O’Connor allowed the state to prohibit cross burning 
that occurs on a person’s yard with intent to intimidate, her decision 
clarified that other kinds of cross burning were protected speech. For 
example, the Court protected a cross burning on a field during a rally in 
 
15 See 538 U.S. 343, 361‒63 (2003). 
16 Id. at 362. 
17 See id. at 365–66 (plurality opinion). 
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which no individuals were singled out as targets of the hateful expression.18 
The Court ruled that this was not a direct threat but instead expressed a 
political viewpoint with no intent to intimidate, albeit a viewpoint with a 
deeply inegalitarian message. O’Connor argued that banning this kind of 
cross burning would unconstitutionally depart from viewpoint neutrality.19 
I call the kind of speech that is not a threat, but that expresses a 
message inimical to the values of free and equal citizenship, a “hateful 
viewpoint.” Speech that does constitute a threat, however, falls into its own 
category. Consistent with the Court’s rulings,20 while hateful viewpoints 
should be protected from coercive bans, in my view, threats can and should 
be prohibited. It is important to emphasize, however, that there is a 
distinction between the emotion of hate and the content of hateful 
viewpoints. I define hateful viewpoints not by the emotion behind them, 
but by their expression of an idea or ideology that opposes free and equal 
citizenship. 
The Court’s distinction between threats and viewpoints in Virginia v. 
Black echoed Brandenburg v. Ohio, which upheld the right of the Ku Klux 
Klan to express its hateful viewpoint.21 Brandenburg overruled the Court’s 
previous “clear and present” standard, which had given the state greater 
power to ban viewpoints. Under that standard, the Court interpreted the 
First Amendment as allowing the state to ban viewpoints that it considered 
subversive and likely to cause long-term destruction to the security of the 
United States.22 The Brandenburg decision replaced the clear and present 
danger standard with a stricter viewpoint-neutral standard that allows limits 
on speech only in cases of imminent harm, such as speech that might 
immediately incite a riot.23 Virginia v. Black reinforced Brandenburg’s 
 
18 See id. at 348–50 (majority opinion). Justice O’Connor later noted that “[b]urning a cross at a 
political rally would almost certainly be protected expression.” Id. at 366 (plurality opinion) (alteration 
in original) (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 402 n.4 (1992) (White, J., concurring)). 
19 See id. at 366–67. 
20 See, e.g., Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
21 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam). In this case, the Supreme Court struck 
down the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act on the grounds that it violated First Amendment protections 
of free speech. Id. at 448‒49. The Court ruled that freedom of expression protects viewpoints that 
advocate violence against particular groups, but it permitted speech to be banned if it incited imminent 
violence. Id. at 449. Brandenburg effectively ended the clear and present danger test and protected a 
wide variety of viewpoints against coercive bans, even when those viewpoints oppose the values of 
liberal democracy. 
22 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). In this case, Justice Holmes announced the 
“clear and present danger” test in explaining why the distribution of leaflets opposing the draft during 
World War I was not protected by the First Amendment. The case upheld the conviction of Schenck, 
the secretary of the Socialist Party of America, under the Espionage Act of 1917. Id. at 53. For almost 
half a century, the clear and present danger test, or versions of it, was used to uphold the criminalization 
of certain viewpoints that were largely to the left of center and believed to be at odds with the interests 
of the United States, as in Schenck. My account of value democracy, like the Court’s decision in 
Brandenburg, rejects the clear and present danger test. 
23 Cf., e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108–09 (1973) (per curiam). 
107:603 (2013) Value Democracy as the Basis for Viewpoint Neutrality 
611 
viewpoint-neutral standard by once again protecting the Klan’s hateful 
expression on the grounds that the First Amendment applies to all 
viewpoints, provided they are not threats or incitements to imminent harm. 
Should a liberal democracy endorse the protection of all viewpoints 
equally by the right to free expression given its premise that all citizens 
should be regarded as free and equal? Viewpoint neutrality protects the 
right to express hateful viewpoints, even though they directly challenge 
value democracy’s commitment to freedom and equality. If these hateful 
viewpoints were to prevail, they could subvert the basic principles of a 
legitimate democratic state. It might seem, then, that the appropriate 
response would be to protect free and equal citizenship by abandoning 
viewpoint neutrality. I hope to suggest, however, that viewpoint neutrality 
as a doctrine of free speech can be complemented by the state’s use of 
democratic persuasion in defense of free and equal citizenship. While value 
democracy’s account of free expression strictly protects free speech for all 
viewpoints, it provides for a robust state role in promoting democratic 
values and criticizing hateful or discriminatory viewpoints. 
Value democracy reinterprets viewpoint neutrality by grounding it in a 
commitment to treat persons as free and equal. This reinterpretation, 
drawing on the work of John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Alexander 
Meiklejohn, connects viewpoint neutrality with a wider set of values that 
are required for political legitimacy, in particular what I refer to as the 
value of free and equal citizenship. 
In developing this argument, it is helpful to begin with the value-based 
defenses of viewpoint neutrality developed by Rawls, Meiklejohn, and 
Dworkin. According to Rawls, political equality requires a respect for the 
“two moral powers” of all citizens to develop and exercise what he calls a 
“capacity for a sense of justice” and a “capacity for a conception of the 
good.”24 Citizens must be free from coercive threat as they develop their 
own notions of justice and the good. Otherwise, they would not be able to 
affirm and choose their own ideas about the most fundamental matters of 
politics (the just) and what constitutes, in their view, a valuable life (the 
good).25 Rawls’s argument could be interpreted to support viewpoint 
neutrality because the value of equality would be violated if some, but not 
all, citizens were free to develop their moral powers. Government 
discrimination or non-neutrality among viewpoints would make respect for 
the exercise of the moral powers unequal, and it would deny political 
freedom to the coerced citizens. Non-neutrality would undermine the equal 
treatment, not only of the citizens whose viewpoints were banned, but also 
of the citizens who could potentially listen to and argue with those 
viewpoints. The state would undermine equal treatment by failing to 
respect the capacity of citizens to make the free decision to accept or reject 
 
24 RAWLS, supra note 8, at 302, 332. 
25 See id. at 334–35. 
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any viewpoint. Viewpoint neutrality is therefore necessary for the full and 
equal exercise of the two moral powers of citizens.26 
A similar line of egalitarian justification for this doctrine can be found 
in the work of Meiklejohn and Dworkin. These thinkers may be interpreted 
as defending viewpoint neutrality in the right of free expression, even for 
the hateful viewpoints held by the Nazis and the Klan, because neutrality is 
required in order to respect the democratic autonomy of citizens to develop 
their own political opinions.27 Meiklejohn famously employs the metaphor 
of a town meeting to argue that all viewpoints must be protected in a 
democracy.28 On his view, while the moderator of a town meeting could 
limit speakers for reasons of time and to ensure that they stay on point, 
censoring speakers based on the substance of their comments would limit 
the meeting’s democratic aims. Such censorship would prevent meeting 
participants from hearing a variety of arguments for and against the 
measure under consideration and would constrain their ability to express 
their own views. This kind of censorship would impede the ability of 
citizens to be the source of their own democratic decisions and so would 
undermine the democratic ideal. 
Like Rawls, Meiklejohn argues that any attempt to discriminate based 
on the content of a particular viewpoint would threaten a regime’s 
democratic credentials, even if those viewpoints were themselves deeply 
undemocratic. Coercively limiting or banning an illiberal viewpoint would 
prevent citizens from actively affirming the core values of democracy. 
According to this argument, we must have the option to consider and reject 
even democratic values if we are to be truly free to affirm them. As Ronald 
Dworkin puts it: 
[A] majority decision is not fair unless everyone has had a fair opportunity to 
express his or her attitudes or opinions or fears or tastes or presuppositions 
or prejudices or ideals, not just in the hope of influencing others, though that 
hope is crucially important, but also just to confirm his or her standing as a 
responsible agent in, rather than a passive victim of, collective action.29 
In short, the right to hear and make all political arguments is a fundamental 
component of equal citizenship. Viewpoint neutrality should therefore not 
 
26 Rawls endorses viewpoint neutrality: “So long as the advocacy of revolutionary and even 
seditious doctrines is fully protected, as it should be, there is no restriction on the content of political 
speech, but only regulations as to time and place, and the means used to express it.” Id. at 336. 
However, the literature on Rawls is divided over whether viewpoint neutrality extends to hate speech, 
since he does not address the issue explicitly in his work. See SAMUEL FREEMAN, RAWLS 72 (2007). 
27 This view of democratic autonomy corresponds with one of Rawls’s moral powers, the capacity 
for a sense of justice. See RAWLS, supra note 8, at 334‒35. 
28 See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 22–27 
(1948). 
29 Ronald Dworkin, A New Map of Censorship, INDEX ON CENSORSHIP, no. 1, 2006, at 130, 131. 
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be confused with a justification for free speech; it is rather a doctrine that 
offers guidance regarding whether it is appropriate to limit coercion. 
One might ask, however, whether it is empirically necessary for 
citizens to have the option to choose inegalitarian principles to develop 
Rawls’s two moral powers or to deliberate about policy. Perhaps 
individuals living under censorship would select the same policy views and 
conceptions of justice and the good that they would choose living under 
freedom. However, I do not read the defenders of viewpoint neutrality as 
making an empirical argument, but rather as presenting a claim about what 
it means to respect citizens as free and equal. It is not that the protection of 
all viewpoints is empirically necessary to develop the two moral powers or 
the capacities for democratic citizenship. Rather, such protection from 
hateful viewpoints would disrespect the independent judgment of free and 
equal citizens, who are regarded as having the two moral powers, if the 
state were to restrict their options. Even if citizens ought not choose views 
that are at odds with an ideal of equal citizenship, it is essential to the 
legitimacy of value democracy that they could choose to embrace 
inegalitarian principles and policies.30 Value democracy is not indifferent to 
whether citizens do choose values of free and equal citizenship. It argues 
that they should not only choose democratic values, but they should also 
engage in a process of reflective revision to scrutinize their beliefs, 
including their “private” beliefs, in light of democratic values. But it is 
essential to this process that citizens are free to choose to endorse the 
values of freedom and equality rather than being coercively forced to do so. 
Much of my emphasis, and that of the familiar free speech tradition 
following John Stuart Mill, is on the problems posed by coercive or 
criminal bans on speech. Such bans are blunt instruments with harmful 
effects. As Mill reminds us, coercive bans risk the loss of partial truths that 
might, as part of public discourse, serve to enlighten, despite being couched 
in arguments that are generally wrong.31 Coercive sanction merely tries to 
bury opinion and therefore misses the grievances that might be held 
legitimately even by those with deeply racist views.32 Mill reminds us too 
that coercive sanction denies citizens the opportunity to clarify what is 
 
30 In Democratic Rights, I defend the idea that respect for free and equal status requires a respect 
not only for democratic rights of participation, but also a respect for other substantive rights protections. 
See COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS (2007). 
31 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 109 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Classics 1987) 
(1859). As Mill writes, “Such being the partial character of prevailing opinions, even when resting on a 
true foundation, every opinion which embodies somewhat of the portion of truth which the common 
opinion omits ought to be considered precious, with whatever amount of error and confusion that truth 
may be blended.” Id. 
32 See Steven H. Shiffrin, Racist Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence, and the Meaning of America, 
80 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 89 (1994). 
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wrong with hateful views.33 As Nancy Rosenblum argues, it also has the 
potential to force these views underground.34 It would be better for hateful 
viewpoints to be publicly seen, tracked, and refuted. 
I have sought to emphasize why value democracy’s defense of 
viewpoint neutrality should be couched in a wider, non-value-neutral 
concern to protect the core values of freedom and equality, which a 
legitimate society must respect. It follows from the grounding of viewpoint 
neutrality in a wider, non-neutral theory that the legitimate state can and 
should protect some views that are at odds with its own core values. A ban 
on certain viewpoints would disrespect the moral powers of free and equal 
citizens because it would, through threat of punishment, force people to 
come to particular conclusions about politics. 
However, there is a tension between hateful viewpoints and the 
democratic values that require protecting those viewpoints. For instance, 
the Klan has been devoted since its founding to opposing racial equality 
under law. Indeed, its founding ambition in the nineteenth century was to 
oppose precisely the kind of guarantees that the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment provides. The Equal Protection Clause is the 
clearest constitutional guarantee of the ideal of equal status, an ideal that 
also serves as a basis of the freedom of speech.35 
The question of whether to protect the Klan’s right to peaceably 
articulate its viewpoint therefore offers a clear illustration of a possible 
tension between the doctrine of viewpoint neutrality as a means of limiting 
state coercion and the values and reasons underlying that doctrine. There is 
a clear conflict between the viewpoint of the Klan, which is protected by a 
right to free speech, and the reasons to protect that viewpoint in the first 
place. In short, the Klan opposes the values of political equality and 
autonomy for all persons subject to law, and these values are the very basis 
for the protection of its rights. 
On my view, it is important to retain a doctrine of viewpoint 
neutrality, but also to give expression to the reasons that underlie that 
doctrine. Thus, the state should protect the rights of hate groups while also 
criticizing their discriminatory views. To see why there is an interest in 
both protecting and criticizing the Klan’s viewpoint, it is important to 
consider three perspectives that reflect the different interests related to free 
speech: those of the speaker, the listener, and the democratic polity as a 
whole. 
 
33 See MILL, supra note 31, at 76 (“If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of 
exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception 
and livelier impression of truth produced by its collision with error.”). 
34 See, e.g., NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS (1998). 
35 See in particular the discussion of the founding of the Klan in Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 
352‒58 (2003). 
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Dworkin describes the interest of citizens as speakers in being able to 
say whatever they wish. If citizens want to articulate a view that is at odds 
with the basis for the state’s legitimacy, coercively preventing them from 
doing so would directly limit their autonomy. Denying speakers the ability 
to say what they want restricts one of the most basic capacities of citizens 
to decide and express their own political positions.36 Dworkin therefore 
emphasizes the importance of the citizen qua speaker in his defense of 
viewpoint neutrality. His view clearly articulates why the affirmative value 
of autonomy requires respect and protection of all viewpoints expressed by 
speakers. 
In addition to the interest of speakers, another interest at stake in free 
speech rights is that of listeners, as Meiklejohn points out in his account of 
viewpoint neutrality.37 To fully exercise their rights to autonomy and to 
form their own opinions, citizens in a democracy must be free to hear and 
consider any viewpoint they wish free from government intrusion. Indeed, 
this interest of the listener might be held by citizens who are critical of 
hateful viewpoints. For instance, if I want to argue against a hateful 
viewpoint, I should be free to seek it out, understand it, and then criticize it. 
A third perspective, according to Charles Beitz and T.M. Scanlon, is 
that of the citizenry as an audience in a democratic polity.38 The interest of 
citizens as an audience is distinct from their interest as listeners. The 
perspective of citizens as listeners is an individual one, whereas the 
perspective of citizens as an audience regards them collectively and 
emphasizes the importance of the whole democratic polity. Citizens as a 
democratic audience have interests at stake in deciding what beliefs should 
prevail in their democracy. In particular, they have an interest in seeing that 
democratic values thrive in the polity as a whole so that the right to vote 
and other procedural and substantive democratic rights are preserved for all 
citizens. 
However, if these institutions are to be preserved, the democratic 
values that support them must also be defended. Some viewpoints, such as 
the Klan’s, oppose the values of free and equal citizenship and are hostile 
to the values that underlie democratic institutions. On my view, the 
appropriate response by the state to this conflict is to protect the free speech 
rights of citizens to make all arguments as speakers and to hear all 
arguments as listeners. At the same time, the state should criticize 
antidemocratic and discriminatory viewpoints to uphold the interests of 
citizens as an audience in preserving democracy. 
It might be objected that my view is unfair to discriminatory 
viewpoints because it does not allow them the equal chance to spread. 
 
36 See Dworkin, supra note 29, at 131–32. 
37 See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 28, at 25. 
38 See, e.g., CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY 212 (1989); T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of 
Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 519, 524–27 (1979). 
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However, this objection rests on a mistaken conception of fairness. Respect 
is owed not to specific viewpoints per se but to individual citizens. 
Viewpoint neutrality requires that the state not coercively limit the free 
speech rights of citizens, but it does not oblige the state to be neutral when 
it comes to the expression and defense of the values central to its own 
legitimacy. Viewpoint neutrality does not mean value neutrality. On my 
account, the state should protect the right to freely express all viewpoints, 
but it should not be neutral in its own expression or endorsement of values. 
The state and its citizens should promote the democratic values of free and 
equal citizenship while at the same time criticizing hateful or 
discriminatory values. 
It would be implausible to interpret neutrality as instead guaranteeing 
equal success for all viewpoints. This misguided interpretation of neutrality 
would commit the state to bolstering viewpoints that seek to deny the rights 
of some citizens. Consider, for instance, whether the state should seek to 
revive Nazi ideology. If neutrality were interpreted as a state obligation to 
guarantee the equal success of all viewpoints, it would require the state to 
affirmatively promote Nazi ideology and other racist beliefs that are 
contrary to its most basic democratic values. The state’s promotion of 
racism would contradict citizens’ interest as an audience in preserving the 
institutions and entitlements of democracy, and in ensuring that the 
democratic values of freedom and equality are widely shared and endorsed. 
Thus, the proper interpretation of viewpoint neutrality and of the state’s 
obligation to protect the right of free expression does not imply that 
everyone has an entitlement for the state to ensure that his own views 
prevail. On the contrary, the state has no obligation to ensure the equal 
success of hateful viewpoints but instead has an interest, on behalf of the 
democratic citizenry as an audience, in seeing that the viewpoints 
consistent with the values of free and equal citizenship succeed while those 
inimical to these values fail. 
I have outlined the tension between two sets of interests: the interest of 
speakers and listeners in viewpoint-neutral protections, and the interest of 
the citizenry as a whole in ensuring that democratic values have a 
prominent place in public discourse and that hateful viewpoints are 
combated. One way to resolve this tension is to simply go the way of 
militant democrats and ban the speech. Indeed, Jeremy Waldron has argued 
in a recent series of articles and a recent book that there would be no loss in 
legitimacy from banning racist ideological viewpoints like those of the 
Klan.39 Waldron asks whether societies that do ban the expression of 
hateful viewpoints have less legitimate law, and he argues that they do not. 
 
39 See Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1596 
(2010) [hereinafter Waldron, Dignity and Defamation]; Jeremy Waldron, Free Speech and the Menace 
of Hysteria, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, May 29, 2008, at 40 (reviewing ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE 
THOUGHT THAT WE HATE (2007)); see also WALDRON, supra note 5. 
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For instance, Waldron’s position would suggest that in countries where 
hateful viewpoints are banned, the power to tax or to enforce the law is no 
less legitimate.40 
I agree with Waldron that some viewpoints risk undermining and 
challenging the equal status of all citizens. As I have emphasized, there is 
no entitlement of a viewpoint to succeed. I also agree with Waldron that it 
would go too far to claim that a society that lacks a doctrine of viewpoint 
neutrality would lack legitimacy in all its laws. But in my view, there 
would be an increase in the degree of democratic legitimacy in a society if 
it could counter hateful viewpoints while still maintaining viewpoint 
neutrality when it comes to protecting speakers from being punished for 
expressing their views. 
To determine whether protecting free speech for hateful viewpoints 
would enhance legitimacy, we would do well to consider whether there is a 
difference between a society that has free speech and few hateful 
viewpoints and a society that limits free speech and has an equal number of 
hateful viewpoints. If it is possible to counter hateful viewpoints while still 
protecting free speech, there would be an overall gain in the degree of 
democratic legitimacy. Specifically, the gain would come from preserving 
the entitlement of individuals to make and hear any opinion they wish. 
Such guarantees would enhance legitimacy by respecting the autonomy of 
citizens as speakers and listeners. It would also avoid the limits on 
autonomy that would come from coercively punishing some speakers. A 
society that offers this kind of viewpoint-neutral protection of free speech 
would also more fully realize political equality because it would extend 
free speech protections to all citizens. The task, then, is to devise a way for 
the state to protect the entitlements of citizens as speakers and listeners to 
say and listen to whatever they desire at the same time that it combats 
hateful viewpoints that seek to undermine the values of free and equal 
citizenship. The aim is to ensure that the interests of speakers, listeners, and 
the “audience” of the democratic citizenry as a whole are all respected and 
realized. 
In my account of value democracy, we can both protect the rights of 
autonomous citizens and counter the discriminatory messages of hate 
groups. We can accomplish this by distinguishing between the state’s 
expressive and coercive capacities. When acting in its coercive capacities, 
the state has an obligation to respect viewpoint neutrality by not coercing 
any speakers or listeners on the basis of their viewpoint. But when the state 
acts in its expressive capacities, the legitimate state has an obligation to 
clarify why some protected viewpoints are at odds with the reasons for free 
expression in the first place. In this role, the state should both protect and 
criticize deeply inegalitarian viewpoints. This state duty follows from the 
 
40 See, e.g., Waldron, Dignity and Defamation, supra note 39, at 1642–46. 
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recognition that it is important not only for legitimate law to be justified, 
but also for the reasons behind the law to be promulgated. 
It is often thought that the state should promulgate or make well-
known the content of the law. Laws passed in secret and never publicized 
are rightly thought to be a paradigm of illegitimacy.41 The content of laws 
must be publicized so that citizens can predict when their actions might be 
sanctioned. But citizens should know not only their rights and the rules that 
are set out by law, but also the reasons for these rights and rules. The key 
issue is how the state might find a way to express the reasons underlying 
rights, given that the state must also protect citizens’ expression of hateful 
viewpoints that oppose these reasons. One place to look for expression of 
the reasons for rights is within the decisions of the Court. The Court is 
ideally an “exemplar” of public reason in the sense that it protects 
democratic values by striking down unconstitutional laws, like those 
constraining free expression.42 In my view, however, the Court acts as an 
exemplar of public reason in a second sense by promulgating the reasons 
for rights. Namely, it acts as a model for the wider citizenry, including 
public officials who deliberate about and make the law, when it explains 
why certain laws are legitimate or illegitimate and when it speaks in 
defense of the values of free and equal citizenship. The Court’s audience 
extends to all citizens who are concerned to think and to deliberate publicly 
about lawmaking. This second notion of the Court as an exemplar of public 
reason is an instance of the state relying on its expressive capacity to 
promulgate the reasons for rights. Ideally, the Court should clarify to the 
citizenry that the state’s protection of hateful viewpoints does not imply its 
approval of these viewpoints, as it has in fact done on some occasions.43 In 
other words, the Court should affirm the importance of rights such as free 
speech while at the same time giving reasons to criticize discriminatory 
views. 
My view is consistent with Redish’s claim that individual autonomy 
(and, I add, equal respect) is central to viewpoint neutrality, but I reject 
some aspects of what he calls epistemic humility. On Redish’s view, the 
First Amendment requires the state to be reticent in endorsing any idea as 
“true” or criticizing any viewpoint as “false.” Here he draws the argument 
from Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. that the Constitution does not admit a 
view about whether opinions are true or false.44 But I have argued that 
 
41 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 39 (1964). 
42 Rawls terms the Supreme Court an “exemplar” of public reason. It is clear he means to do so in 
my first sense, but it is unclear whether he would agree with my extension of this term to the second 
sense, that the Court should be an example for the wider citizenry. See RAWLS, supra note 8, at 231. 
43 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011). In this case, while protecting the 
Westboro Baptist Church’s right to demonstrate on public sidewalks, the Court repeatedly referred to 
the Westboro Baptist Church’s activities as “hurtful.” 
44 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974) (“Under the First Amendment there is 
no such thing as a false idea.”); REDISH, supra note 1. 
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under the Constitution, the values grounding the First Amendment’s rights 
are “true” in the sense that they justify the Court’s protection of rights 
against majorities that would restrict those rights. When the Court strikes 
down majoritarian legislation, it is holding the value of individual 
autonomy above the collective autonomy of the people to make policy 
decisions. The Court has the authority to do so because of the constitutional 
commitment to preserving individual autonomy over other concerns. The 
Court’s action in protecting rights and striking down legislation must 
therefore commit the Constitution to the notion that individual autonomy 
and equal respect are indeed “true ideas” and that viewpoints rejecting 
them are “false ideas.” 
Although the doctrine of viewpoint neutrality does call for a certain 
kind of humility when it comes to coercive action, the Court cannot and 
should not avoid articulating the values that underlie the doctrine. For 
instance, in Virginia v. Black, Justice O’Connor gave evidence that could 
be used to criticize the Klan’s racist views, although she emphasized the 
importance of protecting the group when it is expressing a viewpoint.45 In 
particular, O’Connor underscored that the Klan was founded to oppose 
basic legal protections of equality under law.46 This history highlights why 
the Klan should be viewed as clearly opposing the ideal of free and equal 
citizenship. On my account, the Klan and other organizations with a 
discriminatory message should have the right, under the doctrine of 
viewpoint neutrality, to speak and hold their views, but they do not have a 
right to be free from criticism by the state in its expressive capacities. 
Although the state should be restrained in its coercive capacity so that it 
respects citizens’ autonomy to make their own decisions, the state should 
be free to explain why it protects rights of free speech. Indeed, a robust role 
for the state in defending the values that underlie free speech is another 
way of honoring these values. 
I take the idea of promulgating the reasons for rights to be the first step 
in what I call “democratic persuasion,” which is a central feature of value 
democracy. Although the state should act in a viewpoint-neutral way when 
exercising its coercive capacity, it has an obligation to explain why it 
respects viewpoint neutrality in the first place. The state should use 
democratic persuasion, promulgating or publicly offering the reasons for 
rights, in an attempt to convince citizens that its reasons are good reasons. 
Democratic persuasion encourages citizens to engage in reflective revision, 
with the aim of respecting and incorporating the public values of equal 
citizenship in their own lives, families, and civic associations. But the state 
must be careful to make reasoning central and to avoid force when 
pursuing democratic persuasion. 
 
45 538 U.S. 343 (2003). 
46 See id. at 352 (“The Klan fought Reconstruction and the corresponding drive to allow freed 
blacks to participate in the political process.”). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
620 
II. FREE SPEECH AS AN INVERTED RIGHT 
In this Part, I want to further clarify value democracy’s theory of 
freedom of expression by contrasting it with a noted “expressivist” notion 
of law. The “expressivist” view was developed in the areas of 
Establishment and Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.47 According to 
Elizabeth Anderson and Richard Pildes, rights should be understood not as 
based on the interests of the individual, but rather as delineated by the 
expressive capacities of the state. Establishment Clause jurisprudence, for 
example, can be best understood in terms of what the state should or should 
not express. By this account, a cross in a public school classroom is 
problematic because it suggests that the state is endorsing Christianity. 
According to the expressivist view, it is a mistake to think that we should 
understand why the cross would be problematic by looking to the interests 
of the students. None of these students are coerced directly, nor are their 
interests obviously effected. They may, for instance, simply ignore the 
cross.48 Instead, displaying the cross in a public school classroom is 
problematic for the expressivists because it violates what Anderson and 
Pildes regard as the state’s fundamental identity; it implies that the state is 
Christian.49 Anderson and Pildes helpfully demonstrate that issues 
concerning religious establishment are linked to what the state should or 
should not say when it “speaks.” Inevitably, the state will express a 
message in many circumstances. It is unrealistic that classrooms, for 
instance, could entirely avoid conveying any state message. Rather the 
issue, as expressivists demonstrate, is what the state should say given that it 
will unavoidably express itself. 
I do not wish to dispute Anderson and Pildes’s influential account of 
the Establishment Clause here. Instead, I want to discuss a kind of problem 
that can arise in the tension between state expression and the protection of 
negative rights against coercive intervention. This problem is distinct from 
Anderson and Pildes’s focus on direct state expression relevant to the 
Establishment Clause, so it is not surprising that their theory does not 
address it.50 The right to be free from state coercion in matters of individual 
expression requires a distinct kind of expressivist theory because the way 
that the state conveys its message in protecting free speech is inevitably 
more ambiguous than in the Establishment Clause context. What is 
distinctive about the jurisprudence of the rights related to the Establishment 
Clause is that it concerns direct limits on what the state can say. To the 
 
47 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General 
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1527‒51 (2000). 
48 See id. at 1547–48. 
49 See id. at 1550; see also Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963) (“[W]hile protecting 
all, [the state] prefers none, and it disparages none.” (emphasis omitted)). 
50 My focus is on the right to free speech, but a similar analysis might be given of other negative 
rights like the right to privacy.   
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extent that citizens have a right against the establishment of religion, they 
possess a right against the state endorsing a particular religion. In the 
Establishment context, the relationship between state expression and rights 
is perfectly congruent: the citizen’s right against establishment of religion 
correlates with the state’s duty not to establish a religion. 
Rights to freedom of expression, however, differ in a key sense. In the 
free speech context, I argue, state expression can at times seem to be 
“inverted” when rights are used to protect speech that opposes the reasons 
for the right to free expression itself. For example, the state’s protection of 
free speech rights for hate groups might appear to suggest that there should 
be no judgment about the racist content of the protected expression. In this 
sense, there is a possible tension between the implicit message of speech 
protections and the reasons that are rightly understood to underlie those 
protections. Given the possible confusion that inverted rights present for 
the successful promulgation of the reasons for rights, any workable theory 
of free expression should explain how the state might overcome this 
challenge. 
Value democracy offers an original answer to the challenge of inverted 
rights. It argues that the state should protect rights in a neutral manner, but 
that it should not be neutral regarding the values expressed by hateful 
viewpoints. The state needs to clarify its democratic values due to the risk 
that state protection of hateful viewpoints might be seen as approving or 
condoning them. In other words, there is a risk that in protecting the right 
to express hateful viewpoints the liberal democratic state will be viewed as 
complicit in these viewpoints. Value democracy’s solution to the problem 
of inverted rights then is for the state to protect the right to free speech 
while at the same time criticizing hateful or discriminatory viewpoints. The 
state should engage in democratic persuasion, criticizing hate speech and 
promulgating the reasons for rights. Democratic persuasion therefore solves 
the problem of inverted rights by pronouncing the state’s criticism of 
protected but hateful viewpoints. In this way, democratic persuasion serves 
as a necessary complement to the rights protected under the doctrine of 
viewpoint neutrality. 
Democratic persuasion is distinctive in that it uses the state’s 
expressive capacities to promote the ideal of free and equal citizenship to 
the audience of citizens while limiting coercion by protecting rights to free 
expression through the doctrine of viewpoint neutrality. Although it 
criticizes the viewpoints of discriminatory individuals and groups, it always 
respects their right to free expression. 
It is helpful to contrast my own view with that of the critical race 
theorist Charles Lawrence, who in turn draws on the work of Richard 
Delgado. Lawrence believes that the state is always acting in its expressive 
capacities because all state action, including coercive action, is backed by 
reasons and value judgments. For instance, Lawrence views the decisions 
to desegregate lunch counters and to prohibit signs barring entry to African 
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Americans as themselves expressions of the state’s support for the values 
of equal citizenship.51 Lawrence takes this approach to argue that the state 
should use criminal law to limit hate speech and prosecute hate groups.52 
He points out, as have I, that hate groups directly threaten the basic values 
of a free society and that the state therefore must clearly condemn these 
groups. Lawrence’s approach, however, differs from my own in suggesting 
that the state should express its condemnation of hate groups through 
criminal law. Lawrence, like MacKinnon, rejects the doctrine of viewpoint 
neutrality in favor of a balancing approach to issues of equal protection and 
civil rights.53 
The problem with Lawrence’s account is similar to that of Pildes and 
Anderson’s; it does not recognize the distinction between the type of values 
being expressed when the state acts in its expressive capacities and the type 
of values being expressed when the state protects the speech of citizens and 
groups within society. When the state bans murder in criminal law, it is 
clearly expressing the idea that murder violates the rules of a legitimate 
society. Antidiscrimination law functions similarly; it expresses 
disapproval of the inegalitarian treatment of citizens. But not all decisions 
about coercion are similar. If the state protects a Klansman’s right not to be 
murdered, it does not express support for the Klan’s values, nor is it neutral 
about the Klan’s beliefs. On the contrary, the state that protects the 
Klansman from murder is acknowledging that citizens are entitled to rights 
by virtue of their being citizens, even when their viewpoints are deeply 
illiberal. Thus, it does not follow from the state’s protection of the lives of 
Klan members that the state endorses the viewpoint of these speakers. 
Similarly, the state protects the Klan members’ right to expression for 
reasons related to respect for the liberal principles of freedom, although 
these values are rejected in the content of the Klan members’ speech. 
Lawrence’s critique, despite its inability to differentiate between the 
types of values expressed when the state acts in its two distinct capacities, 
is nevertheless helpful in forcing liberal theory to clarify its reasons for 
refusing to regulate illiberal expression. When the state refrains from 
regulating illiberal viewpoints, it is essential that it also use its expressive 
capacities to clarify that it is not expressing support for the viewpoints 
themselves. The state is instead guaranteeing an entitlement that stems 
from the need to respect all citizens as free and equal. In my account, the 
state can clarify the relationship between the rights and the reasons behind 
rights by clearly condemning hateful political viewpoints while protecting 
them from coercive law. Without this clarification, there is a significant 
 
51 See Lawrence, supra note 6, at 60–62, 85–87.  
52 See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda & Charles R. Lawrence III, Epilogue: Burning Crosses and the 
R.A.V. Case, in WORDS THAT WOUND, supra note 6, at 133 (critiquing the Court’s decision in R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), which invalidated an ordinance that criminalized cross burning). 
53 See MACKINNON, supra note 6, at 71–110. 
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risk that the real meaning of the protection of free expression will be 
inverted. 
Consider in greater depth the Court’s opinion in Virginia v. Black. In 
this case, the Court held that cross burning was protected during a rally in 
which no member of the targeted class was singled out.54 Although the 
Court allowed for the possibility of an exception to the requirement of 
content neutrality in the instance of a threat to particular individuals,55 it did 
not think that the rally constituted such a threat. The Court invoked its 
doctrine of content neutrality,56 which includes but is not limited to the 
doctrine of viewpoint neutrality. The important point for our purposes is 
that the protected “speech” in this case—the burning of the cross—clearly 
opposes the normative reasons that underlie its legality in the first place. 
Liberal theories justify the right to free expression based on free and equal 
citizenship. Yet they should also emphasize why the act of cross burning is 
an affront to these ideals because the reasons for the right, which the state 
has the obligation to express, are at odds with the content of the speech 
protected by the right. Virginia v. Black thus presents a potential paradigm 
of how and why the meaning of rights to freedom of expression should be 
clarified to citizens. Without this clarification, there is a significant risk that 
the real meaning of the protection of free expression and the commonly 
understood meaning will be inverted. 
Part of the Court’s audience in the Black case is legislatures 
considering passing coercive laws that would ban hateful viewpoints short 
of direct threats. These state actors should be reminded of why such laws 
violate the ideal of free and equal citizenship. But a second audience for 
Court opinions is the Klan itself and other hate groups in the marketplace 
of ideas. To these citizens, the Court is saying that while their right to free 
expression is protected, the content of their hateful views conflicts with the 
reasons for those rights protections. In addressing these citizens, the Court 
acts as an exemplar of public reason in the first and second senses 
described previously—it is both protecting a right and promulgating the 
reasons for that right. 
Value democracy argues that the reasons for rights are not just 
intended to be expressed publicly; they are also meant to be persuasive. 
The arguments offered as part of democratic persuasion are intended to 
challenge and change the minds of those who do not appreciate the 
importance of free and equal citizenship in a legitimate society. Of course, 
hate groups including the Klan might not listen to reason or be persuaded, 
but in those cases, it is important to convince third parties and the 
population at large of the values of free and equal citizenship. Part of the 
task here is clarifying that the state is not neutral in regard to groups like 
 
54 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 347–48 (2003). 
55 See id. at 359–60. 
56 See id. at 360–63. 
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the Klan and that the state instead affirms the freedom and equality of all 
citizens. In short, the legitimate state should employ democratic persuasion 
to convince the citizenry as a whole that its reasons for protecting the rights 
of all citizens are good reasons. 
As I have suggested, one example of democratic persuasion is 
Supreme Court opinions. However, these Court opinions on their own may 
not be effective in changing the minds of hate groups that oppose the ideal 
of equal citizenship. The early Klan membership of Justice Hugo Black 
aside, I assume that most members of hate groups are not thinking 
analytically about the nuances of First Amendment doctrine. Although they 
still have an important expressive purpose, we must acknowledge that 
Court opinions alone will not effectively persuade the citizenry at large of 
the reasons for rights. No single institution of government has an exclusive 
monopoly on the reasons that underlie rights. Other state actors in addition 
to the Court should also appeal to these reasons. These institutions should 
be concerned with the question of how to express the reasons for coercion 
and its limits. 
When the state attempts to promulgate the reasons for rights without 
violating freedom of expression, it is essential that it observe two limits: 
means based and substance based. The first, means-based limit of 
democratic persuasion requires that the state not pursue the transformation 
of citizens’ views through any method that violates fundamental rights like 
freedom of expression, conscience, and association. For example, the state 
cannot use criminal sanctions to prohibit Klan meetings on the grounds that 
Klan members reject the reasons for freedom of expression. However, it 
would be appropriate for the state and its public officials to articulate why 
the Klan’s views are inconsistent with the reasons for freedom of 
expression. In my view, the state can avoid crossing the means-based limit 
by confining its method of communicating its message to its expressive 
rather than its coercive capacity. For example, public officials and citizens 
engaged in public discussion may make arguments that seek to transform 
hateful viewpoints. In addition, I will suggest in the next Part that there is a 
wide role for educators and the state more broadly to teach the importance 
of the ideal of equal citizenship. The challenge for value democracy, 
however, lies in simultaneously protecting rights to expression against 
coercive interference while criticizing inegalitarian beliefs protected by 
these rights. 
As I suggested earlier, the criticism involved depends on the degree to 
which the beliefs oppose free and equal citizenship. Hate groups like the 
Klan should be condemned by the state as their very mission is to 
undermine democratic values like the equal protection of all citizens under 
law. However, in many instances, it is the specific discriminatory beliefs of 
citizens that the state should criticize, and in these cases, the state should 
make it clear that it is not condemning their entire belief set. 
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Since the notion of coercion is central to the means-based limit, it is 
worth elaborating on how I will use this term. Drawing on Robert Nozick’s 
work on this subject, I define coercion as the state threat to impose a 
sanction or punishment on an individual or group of individuals with the 
aim of prohibiting a particular action, expression, or belief.57 Coercion, by 
this definition, need not be carried out; indeed some people might resist the 
state’s threats. But the mere fact that a state action is coercive does not 
imply, as some have inferred, that the action is unjustifiable.58 On the 
contrary, there are certainly justifiable cases of state coercion. For example, 
it is justifiable for the state to employ coercive criminal law in an attempt 
to stop citizens from committing acts of violence like murder, rape, and 
assault. The means-based limit, however, suggests that the state should not 
use coercion to prohibit expression. Coercive threats would deny the ability 
of persons to decide for themselves what kinds of policy beliefs to express. 
This denial would fail to respect the entitlement of citizens to develop and 
exercise their moral powers. In particular, coercively banning viewpoints 
would impair the ability of citizens to determine autonomously which 
beliefs they wish to hold and defend. 
It should be emphasized, however, that a state’s attempt to change 
people’s minds by expressing certain beliefs does not constitute coercion 
since the state does not seek to prohibit citizens from holding conflicting 
beliefs. To the contrary, it is central to the idea of expression and, more 
specifically, to the expression and defense of the core values of freedom 
and equality that citizens remain free to reject it. Although I argue that the 
state should seek to persuade citizens to endorse democratic values, it is 
essential to the values of freedom and equality that the state not attempt to 
force acceptance. On the contrary, citizens should be free to reject the 
state’s defenses of the core values of free and equal citizenship. For similar 
reasons, the state should avoid manipulating citizens into accepting the 
values of free and equal citizenship by intentionally misleading them or by 
subliminally trying to change their minds. To respect autonomy, the means-
based limit suggests that democratic persuasion must be transparent. But 
the requirement that democratic persuasion include explicit reasons does 
not mean that it must avoid emotion or rhetorical persuasiveness. Indeed, as 
Sharon Krause has pointed out, there is nothing about the appeal to emotion 
that need be inconsistent with reasoning.59 
 
57 See ROBERT NOZICK, SOCRATIC PUZZLES 15–44 (1997). 
58 I do not, therefore, rely on a moralized conception of coercion. In a moralized conception, an act 
counts as coercion only if it is not fully justified. For an explanation of the moralized conception, see 
ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION (1987). However, my definition differs from the moralized conception 
in that it acknowledges that certain acts can be morally justified and yet coercive. For example, 
imprisoning murderers is coercive in my definition but morally justified. My definition uses the 
nonmoral but normative criterion that acts count as coercion when they attempt to deny a choice. For 
discussion on this point, I thank Eric Beerbohm and Daniel Viehoff. 
59 See SHARON R. KRAUSE, CIVIL PASSIONS (2008). 
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In addition to being subject to a means-based limit, democratic 
persuasion is also subject to a second, substance-based limit. This 
substance-based limit restricts the kinds of beliefs that the state is obligated 
to seek to transform through its expressive capacity as well as the 
circumstances under which the state is justified in exercising that capacity. 
It is necessary for the state to use its expressive capacity to challenge only 
those beliefs that violate the ideal of free and equal citizenship. In 
particular, the state should not seek to transform all inegalitarian beliefs, 
but only those that challenge the ideal of free and equal citizenship. 
It is essential to clarify here that equal citizenship constitutes a 
political ideal; it is not the equivalent to equality in every sense. For 
instance, if I always neglect to pay the check at dinner with my friend, I 
might violate the ideal of an equal friendship, but in doing so I do not 
violate the ideal of equal citizenship. In sum, the substance-based limit of 
democratic persuasion requires the state to criticize only views 
incompatible with the ideal of free and equal citizenship and not views that 
are incompatible with morality per se. 
Of course, there will be easy and hard cases—it is not always obvious 
whether a belief is incompatible with the ideal of equal citizenship and 
therefore subject to criticism by the state. It is only views that are openly 
hostile to the ideal of equal citizenship or implausibly compatible with it 
that the state has an obligation to criticize, according to the substance-based 
limit. For example, the views of hate groups are paradigmatic of views that 
are openly hostile to democratic values or implausibly disguised in a 
language of equality.60 However, groups or citizens who hold opinions that 
might be plausible interpretations of equal citizenship, although there may 
be controversy over them, should not be subject to disapproval by the state 
in its expressive capacities. For instance, while some may think an ideal of 
equality requires affirmative action, other citizens who disapprove of this 
policy are not expressing opinions that are necessarily hostile to or 
implausibly connected to the ideal of equal citizenship. They may oppose 
affirmative action on grounds that may be plausibly interpreted as 
consistent with equal citizenship, like an ideal of colorblindness in the 
college admissions process. The disagreement would be reasonable in that 
case and not subject to democratic persuasion. The substance-based limit 
therefore makes the state use of democratic persuasion more limited than 
the principle of public relevance.61 The principle of public relevance 
identifies conflicts generally between free and equal citizenship and 
 
60 I am thinking, for instance, of the case of former Klan Grand Wizard David Duke. His National 
Association for the Advancement of White People masks clearly inegalitarian views in the language of 
equality. The Association makes the misleading claim on its website that it “campaigns merely for 
equal treatment of all races.” See Thomas Jackson, What Is Racism?, DAVIDDUKE.COM (Oct. 23, 2004), 
http://www.davidduke.com/?p=32. 
61 For a discussion of the principle of public relevance, see BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note †, ch. 2. 
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individual beliefs, and suggests the importance of making these beliefs 
consistent with democratic values. The substance-based limit, on the other 
hand, further narrows the instances when the state should engage in 
democratic persuasion. According to the substance-based limit, the state 
should use democratic persuasion only when individuals hold or advance 
ideas that clearly conflict or are implausibly claimed to be consistent with 
the ideal of free and equal citizenship. 
The substance-based limit of democratic persuasion concerns the 
content of what the state is obligated to say on behalf of its own values. At 
times, the state articulates these values and their justifying reasons through 
state actors, and in these cases, the substance-based limit should then be 
followed. But this limit certainly does not entail that state actors cannot 
articulate opinions on controversial matters when speaking in their own 
capacities. Particular citizens, politicians, or state actors may have their 
own opinions on questions about which there is reasonable disagreement, 
including questions about conflicting interpretations of equal citizenship. 
Moreover, although my focus is on instances in which the state is obligated 
to promote the ideal of free and equal citizenship and to criticize 
viewpoints at odds with it, I hold open the possibility that other kinds of 
state speech might be neither obligatory nor prohibited. Pronouncements in 
favor of public health, like warnings about smoking or trans fat, do not 
violate an ideal of equal citizenship, but neither are they required to clarify 
the meaning of equal citizenship. Such pronouncements might be 
permissible on grounds that are distinct from the ones I explore. 
In sum, democratic persuasion is an attempt by the legitimate state to 
express the reasons and values that underlie rights. In some instances, 
democratic persuasion requires challenging viewpoints that are protected 
by rights, especially when the viewpoints are hateful. But the point of 
democratic persuasion is not merely to express the values of equal 
citizenship as a philosophical exercise. It is ideally an attempt to change the 
minds both of the members of hate groups and of citizens more generally, 
and to keep the hate group’s influence from spreading. Given the choice 
between expressing the values of freedom and equality in a nonpersuasive 
or a persuasive manner, all else being equal, the state should opt for forms 
of persuasion that are more convincing. If the reasons and values that 
underlie rights are central to the legitimacy of the state, it follows that the 
state has a role in defending them, especially when they are under attack. 
Part of defending democratic values is making persuasive arguments on 
their behalf.62 
 
62 Democratic persuasion allows for certain forms of rhetoric to further the democratic values that 
underlie rights, provided that the rhetoric is truthful and combined with the promulgation of reasons. 
My aim, however, is not to provide a roadmap detailing how such rhetoric might be employed but to 
justify and describe the state’s role as it engages in democratic persuasion. A model for the rhetoric of 
democratic persuasion might be found in what Simone Chambers and others have called a “deliberative 
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I have argued so far that an account of free expression should both 
defend the free speech rights of individuals against state coercion and allow 
the state to promote the values that underlie these rights. I have also 
maintained that the state must respect both the substance-based and means-
based limits of democratic persuasion when it promotes the ideal of free 
and equal citizenship through its expressive capacity. I now turn to explore 
how the state might fulfill these duties. The contemporary state can “speak” 
in favor of its own values—and against those who deny the freedom and 
equality of citizens—in a variety of ways, ranging from the direct 
statements of politicians to the establishment of monuments and public 
holidays. Martin Luther King Day and Black History Month exemplify 
official endorsement of the civil rights movement’s struggle for equality. 
Public officials do not shy away from political viewpoints when they 
celebrate and commemorate these official holidays. Rather, they articulate 
the ideal of equal status and celebrate those citizens who have promoted it. 
Far from being viewpoint neutral about southern segregation or groups like 
the Klan, the state promotes a particular viewpoint in defense of equal 
protection. Of course, citizens have the right to dissent from such 
expression. But here the state and its citizens should stand together to 
express disapproval of those who defend segregation in our society or who, 
more subtly, lament the end of “states’ rights” that would protect 
segregation. 
Another way to frame state expression in defense of these values is 
through the state’s action as an educator. When state standards require that 
the history of civil rights and the struggle against groups like the Klan be 
taught in schools, for instance, these matters are not taught in a viewpoint-
neutral way. The movement and its victories are rightly taught as part of 
the American effort to live up to our proclaimed values of equality. The 
hope of public educators in teaching the lessons of Martin Luther King Day 
and Black History Month is that, regardless of what they are taught at 
home, students will learn the value of equal status for all citizens. 
III. DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC PERSUASION 
I now want to turn to the question, important in applying value 
democracy to First Amendment free speech jurisprudence, of whether the 
state might or might not use its spending power to promote the value of 
equal citizenship. In a line of cases that explores whether the government 
can condition its spending power on certain expressive goals, the Supreme 
 
rhetoric,” in which effective communication is tied together with public reasoning, as opposed to a 
“plebiscitary rhetoric,” which tries to change people’s minds without explaining the underlying reasons 
or principles. An account of deliberative rhetoric can help to show that democratic persuasion can 
effectively promote the ideal of free and equal citizenship. See Simone Chambers, Rhetoric and the 
Public Sphere: Has Deliberative Democracy Abandoned Mass Democracy?, 37 POL. THEORY 323 
(2009). 
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Court has alternated between two categorical frames. In the first category 
of cases, the Court has found that when the state creates or designates a 
“limited public forum” for “private speech,” it cannot choose to give or 
withhold subsidies to groups based on their viewpoints, although it can 
potentially use content-based criteria such as obscenity, especially when 
this criteria is related to the purpose of the forum.63 In this category, the 
Court has ruled that viewpoint neutrality in the limited public forum is 
required in order to avoid an unconstitutional limit on free speech. In a 
second category of cases, the Court has said that when spending is used to 
directly express a government-sponsored message, the state can place 
restrictions on the content of speech regardless of the nature of that 
speech.64 On my view, both categories have a distinct but equally flawed 
conception of neutrality at their core. The first wrongly assumes that state 
subsidies of private speech should be viewpoint neutral. The second of the 
Court’s categories seems to wrongly allow the state to say anything, even if 
the speech is directly at odds with the ideal of free and equal citizenship. In 
this Part I suggest why the ideal of democratic persuasion requires 
rethinking these doctrines. 
The Court applied the limited public forum doctrine in the case of 
Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of University of Virginia, concerning 
whether a public university could decide to withdraw subsidies from a 
student group that produced a religious publication.65 The Court decided 
this case on First Amendment grounds regarding freedom of speech, 
invoking a standard of viewpoint neutrality. It ruled that when a public 
university creates a public forum to allow a variety of ideas to be heard, 
access to that forum, including funding, cannot be based on a group’s 
viewpoint.66 In the Court’s terms, the University established a limited 
public forum, which in turn triggered a requirement of viewpoint neutrality 
in access to the forum. 
The idea of a limited public forum is meant to evoke an analogy with 
the kind of broad free speech protections that individuals enjoy in a 
“traditional” public forum such as a park. In these public spaces, the 
government cannot limit what is said based on the viewpoint of a person or 
group.67 The traditional public forum is a zone of free speech. Similarly, the 
Court has suggested that when the government creates a limited public 
 
63 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828‒32 (1995). As the 
Court puts it, the state can regulate based on content (e.g., no sexually explicit speech) if it “preserves 
the purposes of [the] limited [public] forum.” See id. at 829–30. 
64 See Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 585‒88 (1998); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 
U.S. 173, 192‒94 (1991); cf. Rosenberger, 515 U.S.at 834 (“A holding that the University may not 
discriminate based on the viewpoint of private persons whose speech it facilitates does not restrict the 
University’s own speech, which is controlled by different principles.”). 
65 See 515 U.S. at 829. 
66 See id. at 830–32. 
67 See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 268 (1988). 
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forum, all people’s views are entitled to free speech. While all views are 
entitled to free speech in a traditional public forum, the limited public 
forum adds that all views are entitled to be funded if any view receives 
funding.68 While I agree with the Court that all views are entitled to free 
speech, I argue that it is a mistake to hold that all views are equally entitled 
to state funding or grants. 
I do not wish to dispute the specific outcome of the Rosenberger case 
on the grounds I have defended in this Essay. The group in question did not 
oppose the values of free and equal citizenship. But I do believe it a 
mistake to suggest that any time a student group receives a subsidy from a 
state university, freedom of expression requires viewpoint neutrality in 
funding. Taking this approach would mean that a public subsidy could be 
demanded by student groups, even if they espouse values that 
fundamentally seek to undermine the ideal of free and equal citizenship.69 
Consider the question of whether a state university would have to fund an 
organization that opposed the admission of women and racial minorities to 
the school. Members of this group should have a right to speak on campus, 
publish in the student newspaper, or espouse their views in the classroom, 
but this does not imply a right to be subsidized by the school. Both public 
universities and private universities that seek to advance public purposes 
have an interest in seeing that some democratic views succeed while others 
do not. To act on that legitimate interest, universities must be free to 
condition their subsidies on respect for free and equal citizenship. 
Universities should not be forced to give funds in a viewpoint-neutral way 
to all groups, including those that are hateful or discriminatory. 
Imagine a case in which discriminatory viewpoints were spreading on 
a university campus. The university would have an important obligation to 
challenge these views, and it could use its spending power to do so. The 
university should use its subsidy power, funding student groups that respect 
democratic values and withdrawing state support from groups that advance 
discriminatory views. Nothing in this funding policy would limit the free 
speech rights of students to associate or organize. Rather, the public 
university would be acting on its duties to criticize racist or discriminatory 
views and to promote the ideal of free and equal citizenship. Groups that do 
not receive financial support from the university could still exercise their 
rights to free speech and association since they could continue to organize 
and raise private funds. 
 
68 See, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 832–37. 
69 A related issue is present in the case of Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 
(1983). There the Internal Revenue Service denied 501(c)(3) tax status to the University on the grounds 
that its policy banning interracial dating was at odds with the public purpose of educational institutions. 
Id. at 605. On my view, the IRS made the right decision, given Bob Jones’s explicit opposition to rights 
to interracial marriage. Opposition to rights of interracial marriage constitutes a viewpoint that is at 
odds with the ideal of equal citizenship. 
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The Court, in its recent decision Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 
reached the right conclusion when it ruled that a state university did not 
violate the right to free speech when it refused to subsidize a discriminatory 
student group.70 But the Court’s reasoning in the case was flawed because it 
focused on whether the university respected the viewpoint-neutrality 
requirement in funding.71 After describing the case, I will argue that the 
state need not be completely viewpoint neutral in funding student groups in 
that it can and should refuse to fund hateful or discriminatory viewpoints. 
Constitutional doctrine should be shaped to acknowledge this obligation. 
In the case, a student group called the Christian Legal Society (CLS) 
sued the University of California, Hastings College of the Law. The CLS 
claimed that its First Amendment rights to free speech, free association, 
and free exercise were violated when Hastings refused to recognize the 
group as an official student organization. According to Hastings policy, 
only official student organizations were entitled to receive school funding. 
The CLS argued that the school’s policy of recognizing and funding only 
nondiscriminatory student groups violated the First Amendment guarantee 
of viewpoint neutrality as applied to the Christian Legal Society. The CLS 
claimed that the school’s policy violated viewpoint neutrality by 
discriminating against the group’s viewpoint that homosexuality is 
immoral. The group claimed that the First Amendment right to free 
expression protected its refusal to admit gays as members. In the CLS’s 
view, its discrimination against gays expressed the group’s fundamental 
belief that homosexuality is immoral and contrary to Christian teachings. 
The group not only practiced discrimination against gays, it also saw that 
discrimination as fundamental to its expressive purpose. Hastings replied 
that the university’s commitment to nondiscrimination required all student 
organizations, as a condition of receiving funding, to abide by an “all-
comers” membership policy that does not exclude anyone based on sexual 
orientation, race, or gender. Hastings defended its all-comers policy on the 
grounds that it was a viewpoint-neutral condition for funding. When the 
CLS refused to abide by this policy, its subsidy and its recognition as an 
official student group at the law school were discontinued. However, the 
CLS retained the right to meet and speak on campus. 
While I agree with the Court’s result, which sided with Hastings, its 
reasoning for that decision wrongly placed viewpoint neutrality as central 
to the holding in this case. Specifically, I think the Court erred in its belief 
that the denial of funds to the CLS was consistent with the requirement of 
viewpoint neutrality in the limited public forum doctrine.72 On my view, 
 
70 Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 130 S. 
Ct. 2971 (2010). 
71 See id. at 2993–95. 
72 See id. at 2993. Justice Ginsburg wrote: 
 We next consider whether Hastings’ all-comers policy is viewpoint neutral. 
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Hastings’s all-comers policy was not viewpoint neutral, and rightly so. 
However, I disagree with the Christian Legal Society’s claim that because 
the policy was not viewpoint neutral, it was invalid. I suggest instead that 
Hastings should have argued—and that the Court should have held—that 
discontinuing funding was constitutionally permissible state speech. 
To see why nondiscrimination policies are not viewpoint neutral and 
thus why the case should have been argued and decided through the lens of 
the state speech doctrine,73 it is helpful to consider the Court’s decisions 
regarding “compelled association.” Michael McConnell, who argued the 
case before the Supreme Court, cited these cases in his brief for the CLS.74 
As he points out, the Court has recognized that in certain circumstances, 
the state would violate the right to free expression and association if it 
compelled association by requiring a group to admit all applicants for 
membership.75 For example, discrimination is central to the Klan’s 
expressed purpose for existing. Forcing it to admit black and Jewish 
members would undermine its ability to express its hateful viewpoint about 
minorities. For instance, if the Klan were required to allow blacks and Jews 
to join its marches, it would force upon the Klan a message of inclusion 
when the Klan’s preferred message is one of exclusion. Compelled 
association in that case would not be viewpoint neutral because it would 
interfere with the Klan’s expression of its discriminatory viewpoint. 
Similarly, the Court upheld the right of an Irish veterans group to exclude 
gays from a march on the grounds that exclusion was central to the group’s 
expressed disapproval of homosexuality.76 In sum, free expression and 
association rights require the protection of a group’s right to discriminate 
when that discrimination is tied to the expressive purpose of that group. 
Requiring inclusion is therefore not a viewpoint-neutral policy. 
Compelling association in such cases would arguably infringe on these 
groups’ interest in free expression. But there are differences between the 
Christian Legal Society case and the jurisprudence on compelled 
association. Most saliently, cases of compelled association concern whether 
groups can be coerced into accepting members, whereas the Christian 
Legal Society case is about whether a public university can noncoercively 
 
 Although this aspect of limited-public-forum analysis has been the constitutional sticking 
point in our prior decisions, as earlier recounted, we need not dwell on it here. It is, after all, 
hard to imagine a more viewpoint-neutral policy than one requiring all student groups to accept 
all comers. In contrast to Healy, Widmar, and Rosenberger, in which universities singled out 
organizations for disfavored treatment because of their points of view, Hastings’ all-comers 
requirement draws no distinction between groups based on their message or perspective. An all-
comers condition on access to RSO status, in short, is textbook viewpoint neutral. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
73 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
74 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23‒27, Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (No. 08-
1371), 2009 WL 1265294, at *23–27. 
75 See id. at 25. 
76 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
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grant or discontinue state subsidies to groups. But while I will suggest that 
the difference between coercion and state subsidy is an important one, it 
should not be confused with the question of whether an all-comers policy is 
viewpoint neutral. An all-comers policy would not be viewpoint neutral 
towards the Klan or as applied to the CLS because it would be critical of 
those groups’ discriminatory viewpoints as expressed by their membership 
policies. 
The fact that Hastings’s nondiscrimination policy is non-neutral, 
however, does not imply that it violates freedom of expression. Whether it 
is consistent with the right of free expression depends on the method used 
to promote nondiscrimination. It would violate the right to free expression 
and association to force the CLS, the Klan, or the participants in the Irish 
parade to change their membership policies. Doing so would be a coercive 
case of compelled association. But it would be compatible with the right to 
free expression and association if a public university noncoercively 
discontinued its subsidy to the CLS. The CLS would still retain its right to 
free expression since it could continue to congregate on campus, express its 
views, and follow its chosen membership policy. There would be no 
compelled association. Instead, Hastings would be taking the noncoercive 
step of refusing to grant a state subsidy to the group. 
On my view, the Court should have decided this case as an instance of 
Hastings exercising state speech through the use of its funds and its 
recognition of official student groups. Hastings’s use of funds should have 
been seen as an example of state speech that rightly pursued the goal of 
promoting nondiscrimination and the ideal of free and equal citizenship. In 
my account of value democracy, it would have been not only 
constitutionally permissible for Hastings to use its expressive capacities to 
promote a message of nondiscrimination; it also would have had a duty to 
do so as a matter of political morality. It is essential that we craft our 
constitutional jurisprudence regarding the First Amendment to allow the 
state to pursue its duty of democratic persuasion. The state speech doctrine 
leaves this pursuit constitutionally permissible.77 
If the state were to continue to fund the CLS, it would raise the 
problem of complicity. The state’s financial support for the CLS would 
make it complicit in the group’s message of discrimination. This would be 
an illegitimate policy since it would undermine the freedom and equality of 
gay citizens. It would also violate the public law school’s mission of 
promoting a legal profession that does not discriminate based on sexual 
orientation, race, or gender. Hastings should be allowed to respect the ideal 
of free and equal citizenship—and indeed, it has a moral obligation to 
respect that ideal—by refusing to subsidize a discriminatory group. I 
believe that such an approach would be more honest about Hastings’s 
 
77 See, e.g., Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 (“[T]he Government has not discriminated on the basis of 
viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one activity to the exclusion of the other.”). 
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policy, but it would require abandoning the limited public forum 
requirement of viewpoint neutrality. 
Part of what often triggers a neutralist analysis by the Court is the 
intent by the school to distribute funds in a neutral way. Hastings 
mistakenly argued in this case that it intended to create a public forum, and 
it then claimed that its all-comers policy was viewpoint neutral. Within 
existing case law, democratic persuasion could likely be pursued by 
universities and colleges if they declared that their intention was not to 
create a public forum but rather to promote a message of respect for the 
freedom and equality of all citizens. In this way, universities could avoid 
the viewpoint-neutrality requirement that the Court applies to the limited 
public forum. But I would argue that the Court should reject the viewpoint-
neutrality requirement itself concerning discriminatory viewpoints when it 
comes to state funding. This would allow the state and public universities 
to promote a message of respect for free and equal citizenship when 
deciding to grant subsidies. While viewpoint neutrality has a place in 
ensuring that no viewpoint is coercively banned, it would be inappropriate 
to apply a requirement of viewpoint neutrality to state subsidies for 
discriminatory groups.78 
A funding policy of limiting or discontinuing state subsidies to 
discriminatory or hateful groups would be compatible with the rights of 
these groups to free speech or association. While it would violate the rights 
of student groups to coercively ban them, the use of subsidies is 
significantly different because it is a noncoercive means for the state to 
promote equality. It allows groups and individuals to retain their right to 
express themselves without fear of imprisonment or the use of force. They 
can continue to meet and speak in public.79 However, they do not have a 
 
78 For a defense of the Court’s neutralist approach, which prefigures its Hastings opinion, see 
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive Association and Government Subsidies, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1919 
(2006). Although I agree with Volokh that Hastings College of the Law has an entitlement to deny 
subsidy to a discriminatory student group, I disagree with him and the Court when he contends that 
Hastings’s all-comers policy is viewpoint neutral. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, Why No-Discrimination-
Based-on-Religion Conditions for Government Benefits Aren’t Viewpoint-Discriminatory, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Dec. 11, 2009, 1:09 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2009/12/11/why-no-discrimination-
based-on-religion-conditions-for-government-benefits-arent-viewpoint-discriminatory/. On my view, 
Hastings’s policy was not viewpoint neutral. However, I argue that viewpoint neutrality is the wrong 
standard for determining state subsidies. Instead, the state should use a non-neutral standard, based on 
respect for free and equal citizenship, in its decisions to grant funds. The state or a public university 
should not grant funds to groups that are discriminatory or otherwise fail to respect free and equal 
citizenship.  
79 Although I believe this case should have been seen as a state speech case, it is worth considering 
an argument in the alternative that also would have left room for democratic persuasion. If Ginsburg 
insisted on seeing this case as a limited public forum case, she might have acknowledged that the policy 
was not viewpoint neutral as applied to the Christian Legal Society but asserted that the state had a 
compelling interest that was narrowly tailored in promoting a message of nondiscrimination. This 
would have followed the logic of the Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622‒29 
(1984), upholding a Minnesota law banning discrimination against women in a private club, but would 
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right to be subsidized by the state in promoting a message of 
discrimination.80 
While my account of value democracy disagrees with the Court’s 
viewpoint neutrality in the limited public forum doctrine, there are other 
parts of the Court’s jurisprudence that are closer to the aims of democratic 
persuasion. In these cases, the Court often acknowledges that the 
government should be allowed to promote its own message using state 
funds. For instance, in National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, four 
artists who had failed to win National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) 
grants challenged the NEA’s policy of using “content-based” criteria in 
distributing funds.81 In particular, the NEA had been instructed by Congress 
to “tak[e] into consideration general standards of decency and respect for 
the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.”82 The Court, ruling 
against the artists, held that the NEA could award grants based on its own 
standards of artistic merit. The NEA did not need to be neutral about the 
content of the art it was funding, so long as “content” refers to artistic or 
cultural significance or a concern about decency.83 
A harder case would have arisen if the NEA had used not only 
content-based criteria that discriminated among artistic work by merit and 
decency, but also viewpoint-based criteria, either generally or as applied to 
a particular artist. Viewpoint-based criteria refer to political beliefs, like 
democratic values or hateful viewpoints, as opposed to more general and 
nonpolitical content-based criteria, like artistic skill and originality.84 In 
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion, the Court allowed the NEA to use 
content-based criteria in awarding grants, but it cautioned that it might have 
 
have run into conflict with its holding in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). The 
Court might have distinguished Dale (upholding the Boy Scouts’ right to exclude gays from 
membership on grounds of free association), however, on the grounds that Christian Legal Society 
concerned matters of subsidy, not coercion, and thus the state had a compelling interest in using the 
funds to promote its own message. 
 Although I do not think Christian Legal Society should have been decided as a limited public forum 
case, my arguments here do suggest a general way of conceiving of First Amendment viewpoint 
neutrality when the Court invokes this doctrine. The First Amendment in limited public forum cases 
might ultimately protect viewpoint neutrality only within the boundaries of respect for free and equal 
citizenship. This version of viewpoint neutrality might ultimately be justified as constitutional doctrine 
by recognizing a compelling government interest in promoting the ideal of equality that, even in state 
subsidy cases that trigger limited public forum analysis, overrides the general interest in viewpoint 
neutrality. 
80 In another place, I consider circumstances where the line between subsidy and coercion is more 
difficult to draw, particularly in cases involving individuals with no other access to resources. For a 
discussion, see BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note †, ch. 4. However, I do not believe these circumstances 
apply in this case. 
81 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
82 Id. at 572 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1) (2006)). 
83 See id. at 585. 
84 See, e.g., id. at 581–86 (discussing the differences between content- and viewpoint-based 
decisionmaking). 
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reached a different outcome if the NEA’s policy had been viewpoint based. 
For example, the NEA might not have been allowed to sponsor viewpoint-
based art that celebrated the civil rights movement and criticized racism. 
Such a policy would have discriminated against racist viewpoints in the 
grant competition.85 
Although this policy for distributing NEA funds would not be 
viewpoint neutral, I believe that it would be constitutionally permissible 
and the right kind of public policy. As I have argued, the state has an 
obligation not only to protect viewpoints from coercion, but also to 
promote the democratic values that justify rights. One goal of state funding 
should be to express the democratic values of free and equal citizenship. 
For example, the state could fund an art program or documentary film that 
seeks to explore the importance of the values of the civil rights movement. 
But I would oppose funding hate groups, even if their expression were 
artistically “meritorious.” Although D.W. Griffith’s Birth of a Nation and 
Leni Riefenstahl’s Nazi propaganda film Triumph of the Will are often 
cited for their original and influential cinematography, they express 
viewpoints that the state should not be complicit in or subsidize. Decisions 
about state funding should therefore not be viewpoint neutral. Instead, there 
should be a role for democratic persuasion in funding art that furthers the 
democratic values of free and equal citizenship as opposed to subsidizing 
hateful viewpoints. 
The state speech doctrine as it currently exists, however, has a more 
subtle but equally problematic conception of neutrality at its core. During 
the first Bush Administration, clinics that received federal funds were 
banned by the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) from 
telling patients about their right to have an abortion. This ban later became 
known as the “gag rule.”86 Pro-choice and free speech advocates brought 
suit against the Department, challenging the gag rule as a violation of First 
Amendment free speech protections. The Court ruled in Rust v. Sullivan 
that the HHS gag rule violated no rights because the state was using its 
spending power to directly express its own viewpoint in a manner similar 
to when it orders its own employees to express a message.87 The Court 
avoided the viewpoint-neutral requirement of the public forum doctrine by 
arguing that the clinics and doctors were speaking on behalf of the state. 
 
85 See id. at 587 (“If the NEA were to leverage its power to award subsidies on the basis of 
subjective criteria into a penalty on disfavored viewpoints, then we would confront a different case.”). 
86 See Editorial, Obama’s Turn on Gag Rule, REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, OR), Jan. 26, 2009, at 
A8. The rule gave rise to Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 179 (1991), although the term “gag rule” is not 
used in the opinion. 
87 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 192‒94. 
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The Court concluded in this case that the state can condition its use of 
funds on a non-viewpoint-neutral requirement, including the gag rule.88 
My own framework, with its means-based and substance-based limits 
on democratic persuasion, serves as an alternative to the Court’s 
jurisprudence. Specifically, although I agree with the Court’s contention in 
Rust that the state need not be viewpoint neutral because it is speaking, in 
this case, I take issue with its conclusion on substantive grounds related to 
the content of democratic persuasion. Democratic persuasion concerns the 
state’s obligation to promote the values of free and equal citizenship. But in 
the case of the gag rule, the state expressed itself in a way inconsistent with 
the most basic democratic values of a legitimate society, violating the 
substance-based limit. The problem with the gag rule is that it sought to 
deny information to citizens, not only about their medical options, but also 
about their legal rights. In a democracy, hindering access to information 
about legal rights keeps citizens both from being treated as equals and from 
being treated as free individuals capable of making their own decisions. 
Withholding such information suggests that some citizens are inferior since 
they are treated as incapable, unlike the elites in the “know,” of making 
decisions about how to exercise their rights. It is important to emphasize 
here that my concern has to do with the policy of denying information 
about a right of free citizens. I do not mean to suggest in upholding this 
right to information that the state should take a position in its expressive 
capacity in order to persuade citizens of one position or another on 
abortion. 
Value democracy allows the state to take a non-viewpoint-neutral 
approach to state expression and funding. But for instances of state 
expression and funding to qualify as democratic persuasion, they cannot 
promote just any value. Rather, state expression and funding must be 
consistent with a respect for free and equal citizenship, as required by the 
substance-based limit. The gag rule violated the substance-based limit and 
would fail to qualify as democratic persuasion. Since it denied access to 
information about legal rights and did not treat citizens as free and equal, 
the gag rule in Rust was an improper use of the state’s expressive and 
funding powers. Just as the state would violate its mandate as a speaker if it 
were to advocate for an ideal of inequality under law, so too, by denying 
 
88 The Court doesn’t discuss public forum doctrine in Rust, but it later distinguishes expenditure 
cases from public forum cases in Rosenberger. The distinction is as follows: 
[In Rust], the government did not create a program to encourage private speech but instead used 
private speakers to transmit specific information pertaining to its own program. We recognized 
that when the government appropriates public funds to promote a particular policy of its own it 
is entitled to say what it wishes. When the government disburses public funds to private entities 
to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that 
its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee. 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (citation omitted) (citing 
Rust, 500 U.S. at 194, 196–200); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 437 (2006) (holding that 
the First Amendment does not forbid the government from disciplining its employees’ speech). 
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access to information about legal rights in Rust, the state failed to promote 
the right values. The gag rule example demonstrates that rights against 
coercion are not the only limits on government action. Importantly, the 
substance-based limit on democratic persuasion also requires that the 
content of the state’s expression not itself conflict with the ideal of free and 
equal citizenship. Democratic persuasion thus provides a normative 
standard, in the form of the democratic values of free and equal citizenship, 
to limit and to evaluate the content of state expression and funding. 
My claim that there should be substance-based and means-based limits 
on democratic persuasion is both a normative principle and a constitutional 
one. The state should be constitutionally permitted to speak in favor of the 
ideal of free and equal citizenship, but the Court should also restrict state 
speech to its proper scope. State speech that is racist or that otherwise 
clearly opposes the ideal of free and equal citizenship should be 
constitutionally limited. I therefore agree with Michael Dorf’s argument 
that some state speech is sometimes constitutionally prohibited. According 
to Dorf, these constitutional limits on state speech might derive from a 
variety of constitutional provisions, including the Establishment, Due 
Process, and Equal Protection Clauses.89 For instance, drawing on Dorf and 
the arguments in my book, When the State Speaks, What Should It Say?, we 
might see wrongful forms of state speech as failing the rational basis 
review triggered by an equal protection claim. Rational review requires the 
state to pursue “a legitimate interest.” This burden is not met when the state 
speaks in a way that is directly at odds with the core values of free and 
equal citizenship. For example, racist state speech might be found to 
constitute “animus” and therefore might fail the requirement that the 
government pursue a legitimate government interest.90 
A doctrine of unconstitutional state speech, however, should be 
restrained by appeal to the substance-based limit on democratic persuasion. 
I introduced this limit earlier in the context of the state’s obligation to 
pursue democratic persuasion. I argued that the state did not have an 
obligation to criticize views that could plausibly be consistent with the 
ideal of free and equal citizenship, even if there were some evidence that 
they were ultimately inconsistent with that ideal. Similarly, the substance-
based limit suggests restraint on Court decisions about the constitutionality 
of state speech. On my view, state speech must clearly be at odds with the 
ideal of free and equal citizenship to be found unconstitutional. 
Democratic persuasion might seem to abandon important features of 
the Court’s current limited public forum doctrine. One distinction between 
 
89 Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class Citizenship, and Law’s Social Meanings, 
97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1286‒98 (2011). See too my discussion of the “Lukumi principle” in 
BRETTSCHNEIDER, supra note †, ch. 5, at 144–57. 
90 See Dorf, supra note 89, at 1277. See, for instance, Dorf’s excellent discussion of the 
“Confederate battle flag.” Id. at 1316‒23. 
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state speech decisions like Rust and limited public forum decisions like 
Christian Legal Society might be thought to lie in the nature of the 
subsidies at issue. It might be thought that unlike state speech cases, limited 
public forum cases involve the state distributing funds to private actors. 
The Court’s distinction rests on an apparent difference in the subject who is 
speaking. If it is the state speaking, it has more leeway to depart from 
viewpoint neutrality than when it is distributing funds to private actors who 
are the speakers. 
But both state expression in Rust and the state subsidizing private 
speech in Christian Legal Society concern whether the government can use 
its spending power to promote or criticize particular non-neutral values and 
viewpoints. Indeed, it is quite difficult to discern the difference between the 
public forum cases and public expression cases solely in terms of the 
structure of funding. The doctors in Rust and the artists in Finley were 
private actors just like the students in Christian Legal Society. On the view 
I have sketched, the state would be free to promote a message of 
nondiscrimination regardless of how its funding were structured. 
Another key difference between neutralist public forum cases, such as 
Christian Legal Society, and non-neutralist state expression cases, such as 
Finley, might be found in the intent or purpose of the funding. But as I have 
suggested in my discussion of Christian Legal Society, if that is the sole 
criterion, it is not difficult for an institution to avoid the requirements of 
viewpoint neutrality. If the state could avoid the viewpoint-neutrality 
requirement merely by stipulating that one of its purposes in distributing 
funds is to promote free and equal citizenship, it would be easy to 
overcome by careful wording of the Law School’s intent in its rules for 
distributing funds. It would be a mistake, however, to claim that the limited 
public forum doctrine and the viewpoint-neutrality requirement are 
required to always protect private speech from public influence. Such a 
doctrine would be at odds with the obligation of the state to pursue 
democratic persuasion, and it would mistakenly place the neutralist 
understanding of free speech in the way of the state promoting democratic 
values. Democratic persuasion suggests that the state should use its subsidy 
power to promote the values of free and equal citizenship. 
Some defenders of the neutralist approach to free speech and 
government subsidy might claim that I am proposing an unconstitutional 
condition on private speech.91 This criticism might be interpreted to require 
that state conditions for funds should not be tied to a group’s acceptance of 
a particular viewpoint. To the extent that this doctrine would require 
viewpoint-neutral distribution of state funds, I believe it is a mistake. On 
my view, there is no such thing as private speech that should be protected 
from any influence by the state. Free speech entails the right to be protected 
 
91 See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 
(1989). 
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from coercion, but it does not entail the right of any individual to be free 
from the promotion of the core values of free and equal citizenship central 
to the state’s legitimacy.92 The right of free speech does not create an 
entitlement of any individual or group to be free from criticism in 
advancing beliefs or ideologies inimical to core democratic values.93 
Throughout this Essay, I have argued for the importance of democratic 
persuasion to promote the ideal of free and equal citizenship. I have argued 
that when the state declines to fund organizations like the Christian Legal 
Society, the Court should apply its state speech doctrine and avoid the 
viewpoint-neutrality requirement of limited public forum analysis in 
allowing the state to express a particular viewpoint. Although I have not 
argued against the limited public forum doctrine as a whole, and I have 
recognized that the government might sometimes fund speech apart from 
government-sponsored messages, the doctrine must be crafted to allow for 
democratic persuasion. Government should be entitled to refuse to fund 
viewpoints that are at odds with the core values of a liberal democratic 
state. But if the Court were to reject my suggested doctrinal course, and 
instead continued to expand the neutralist analysis of the limited public 
forum doctrine to cases where the state engages in democratic persuasion, 
there is a danger that the Court might ultimately find itself at odds with the 
fundamental holding in Bob Jones University v. United States.94 In that 
case, the Court largely dealt with issues of free exercise and statutory 
interpretation when it upheld the IRS’s decision to deny tax exemption to 
Bob Jones University, an organization that prohibited interracial dating and 
the advocacy of interracial marriage on its campus. An expansion of the 
limited public forum doctrine, however, might place in jeopardy the 
Court’s holding in that case that there was no free speech violation in the 
IRS’s denial of nonprofit status to the university.95 
Imagine that Bob Jones University made the argument that the 
distribution of the subsidies associated with nonprofit status constituted a 
limited public forum and therefore no group that was otherwise eligible for 
 
92 It is worth bearing in mind that democratic persuasion, with its substance- and means-based 
limits, requires the promotion only of the values of free and equal citizenship. It does not require the 
state promotion of particular partisan politics or sectarian views. 
93 The state has an obligation to be transparent about its own reasons. I take this concern to be at 
the heart of the obligation to clarify its own reasons for the inverted rights that protect hateful 
viewpoints from coercion. The same principle supports the notion that the state should be clear when it 
is expressing its own viewpoint and not attribute its views to private actors. For discussion on this point, 
see Abner S. Greene, (Mis)Attribution, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 833 (2010). Greene rightly defends this 
concern and also prominently defends the need of the state to promote its own values. See Abner S. 
Greene, Speech Platforms, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1253 (2011). I have emphasized the importance of 
the state criticizing views at odds with the ideal of free and equal citizenship, for instance by denying 
subsidies. The conflict that defines this criticism often makes it clear that there is a difference between 
the views of private actors, which they are entitled to hold, and the state’s own viewpoint. 
94 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
95 See id. at 602–04.  
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such funds could be denied them on the grounds that it held a disfavored 
viewpoint.96 Bob Jones could argue that its discriminatory policies were 
tied to its fundamental expressive message that there should be no intimate 
mixing among different races. Under this argument, the Court would have 
to reverse its decision in Bob Jones University because the IRS policy of 
not granting tax exemption to discriminatory groups was based on a non-
viewpoint-neutral standard, in violation of the limited public forum 
doctrine. 
My own analysis suggests a straightforward understanding of why 
there was no free speech violation in the Bob Jones University decision. On 
my account, the IRS in its interpretation of nonprofit law should be allowed 
to promote an ideal of nondiscrimination by denying tax-exempt, nonprofit 
status to an organization that opposes the basic ideal of equality before the 
law. The IRS in this case can be seen as engaging in democratic persuasion 
and the promotion of the state’s viewpoint about nondiscrimination. But if 
the distribution of tax-exempt, nonprofit status were to be viewed instead 
through the lens of the limited public forum doctrine, this would require 
viewpoint neutrality in deciding which groups would receive nonprofit 
status. Such a viewpoint-neutral analysis would have made it impossible 
for the state to assign nonprofit status based on its vision of the public 
good. The denial of nonprofit status to Bob Jones University, because it 
was based on a criticism of its viewpoint, might have been unconstitutional 
under the limited public forum doctrine. 
Indeed, advocates such as Michael McConnell, who successfully 
convinced the Court to apply the limited public forum doctrine in the 
Christian Legal Society case,97 might ultimately concede that their 
approach would lead to a reversal of Bob Jones University. I have argued at 
length in this Essay, however, why such a reversal of Bob Jones University 
would cut off the possibility of the state defending the values of free and 
equal citizenship and of answering the paradox of rights. Indeed, the IRS’s 
action in Bob Jones University, as well as the Court’s holding in that case, 
stands as a bulwark against misplaced uses of the important constitutional 
ideal of viewpoint neutrality in rights against coercion. 
In sum, I have sought to argue that state funding should be used to 
promote the core values of free and equal citizenship and to criticize 
viewpoints that challenge those values. The power to spend is one of the 
means for the state to effectively promulgate the reasons that underlie 
rights. In this respect, the state is not a neutral umpire among competing 
views, especially when it comes to those views that challenge the very 
reasons and values that justify rights. Nor are beliefs that are incompatible 
 
96 Cf., e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. 
Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). CLS made this same argument, but the Court held that the school’s 
policy was viewpoint neutral. See id. at 2994–95. 
97 See supra text accompanying notes 74–75. 
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with the ideal of equal citizenship “private” in the sense that the state has 
no role in seeking to change them. On the contrary, the state should seek to 
protect the freedom of expression from coercion while persuading those 
who hold viewpoints at odds with the states own core values to change 
their minds. Particularly when it comes to the promotion of the ideal of 
equal citizenship, the state should express the very values that underlie the 
freedom of speech in the first place. Moreover, I have also suggested that 
the state should also be constitutionally restricted in its own speech, when it 
promotes a message inconsistent with the ideal of free and equal 
citizenship. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Essay, I have defended a theory of free speech that embraces 
viewpoint neutrality in rights against state coercion. On my account, the 
right of free speech should protect all viewpoints from coercive 
punishment. Viewpoint neutrality is necessary for the state to respect 
citizens as free and equal, meaning that citizens have the equal autonomy to 
hear and make all arguments, including those that reject liberal democracy 
itself. This equal autonomy must be respected for all citizens to be able to 
make democratic decisions. 
While defending viewpoint neutrality in rights against coercion, I have 
argued that the state should not be neutral in its own expression regarding 
the values of free and equal citizenship. For instance, it is appropriate for 
the state to designate Martin Luther King Day as an official holiday and to 
build public monuments to King while not setting aside a holiday or 
monument to the segregationist George Wallace. Public officials should be 
free to argue for the views of the civil rights movement and to criticize the 
views of the Ku Klux Klan. In making this point, I have drawn on Justice 
O’Connor’s history of the Klan in Virginia v. Black. Writing for a majority 
of the Court, O’Connor upheld the Klan’s right to burn a cross but detailed 
a history that showed the Klan to be opposed to the ideal of free and equal 
citizenship, and in particular, equality under law. Building on this dictum, I 
have made the further claim that the state should criticize hateful and 
discriminatory viewpoints in its expressive capacities. While the state must 
be viewpoint neutral in regards to coercion, on my account it should not be 
viewpoint neutral in defending the values of free and equal citizenship. The 
state should engage in democratic persuasion, speaking in favor of the 
reasons for rights, which are based on respect for the equal autonomy of all 
citizens. 
My contention is broadly consistent with the Supreme Court doctrine 
of state speech, which allows constitutionally permissible departures from 
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viewpoint neutrality when the state is using its expressive capacities.98 But I 
have argued that the doctrine of state speech should be reinterpreted in two 
ways. First, I go beyond the claim that state speech is permissible. I 
contend instead that First Amendment law should be crafted to allow a 
certain type of state speech, what I call democratic persuasion, which 
defends free and equal citizenship and criticizes hateful or discriminatory 
viewpoints. Democratic persuasion should be seen as morally obligatory 
for the state and not merely permissible. 
Democratic persuasion requires the state to use the substantive 
standard of not supporting hateful or discriminatory viewpoints when 
funding groups or giving grants. For example, in the Christian Legal 
Society case, the Court rightly allowed the Hastings College of the Law not 
to fund a discriminatory student group. But the Court wrongly based its 
ruling on the limited public forum doctrine, which requires showing that 
the criterion for funding is viewpoint neutral. Instead, the Hastings College 
of the Law, as an institution of the state, should be allowed to use its 
spending power to advocate the reasons for rights. Rather than applying the 
limited public forum doctrine to this case, the Court should have decided it 
on the grounds that Hastings was engaged in state speech promoting the 
value of nondiscrimination. This distinction is important because the state 
speech doctrine does not require viewpoint neutrality, unlike the limited 
public forum doctrine.99 Nondiscrimination is not a viewpoint-neutral idea, 
as evidenced by the many groups that are ideologically opposed to it. Thus, 
Justice Ginsburg’s attempt to apply the limited public forum doctrine was 
inconsistent with the conclusion she wanted to reach since she was using a 
viewpoint-neutral standard to support a non-neutral policy. Similarly, I 
have suggested, in my comments on NEA v. Finley, why viewpoint 
neutrality should not apply to government grants in the arts. The state 
should be free to promote the values of free and equal citizenship, even if it 
means criticizing discriminatory viewpoints. For instance, the state would 
be well within its rights not to fund a film like Triumph of the Will given its 
racist viewpoint.100 
A second modification to the doctrine of state speech is that there 
should be constitutionally recognized limits on what it is permissible for 
the state to say. The state should not be allowed to express hateful or 
discriminatory viewpoints itself, or to deny access to information about 
basic rights to its citizens. I have thus criticized the Court’s holding in Rust 
 
98 See, e.g., Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587–88 (1998); Rust v. 
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192–93 (1991). 
99 Compare Rust, 500 U.S. at 193 (“The Government can . . . selectively fund a program to 
encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an 
alternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in another way.”), with Christian Legal Soc’y, 
130 S. Ct. at 2984 (“Any access barrier must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral . . . .”). 
100 See Roger Ebert, Silencing of the Lambs: Decades Later, the Nazi Propaganda Vehicle Casts a 
Horrifying Shadow, CHI. SUN-TIMES, June 27, 2008, at D2. 
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v. Sullivan for allowing the state to deny access to information about basic 
rights. I have explained that democratic persuasion should be subject to 
both means-based and substance-based limits. The substance-based limit on 
democratic persuasion is that the state should only promote the values of 
free and equal citizenship, and the means-based limit is that it should not 
use coercive means, such as punishments or prohibitions on speech. Rust v. 
Sullivan stands as an example of violating the substance-based limit on 
democratic persuasion since the state attempted to limit the transfer of 
information about a basic constitutional right. In short, although the state 
should speak in favor of the freedom and equality of all citizens, that 
obligation does not mean that it can say anything. 
While respecting means-based and substance-based limits on 
democratic persuasion, the state should engage in criticism of 
discriminatory and hateful viewpoints because of two important concerns. 
First, thinkers like Jeremy Waldron and Catherine MacKinnon express the 
concern that the spread of hateful views might undermine the standing of 
citizens as free and equal.101 I have proposed democratic persuasion to 
check the spread of hateful viewpoints throughout a society without 
resorting to banning them. Second, there is a danger that when the state 
protects hateful viewpoints, it will be seen as being neutral towards or 
complicit with them. This impression might arise because free speech 
rights have an “inverted” character: they protect viewpoints that seek to 
undermine the very basis of rights in the values of free and equal 
citizenship. To avoid complicity with hateful viewpoints, the state should 
clarify its stance towards them and defend the values of autonomy and 
equal respect for all citizens through democratic persuasion. 
My account of free expression stands in contrast to two other 
dominant ways of understanding free speech. It endorses viewpoint 
neutrality in free expression rights and thus differs from the prohibitionist 
approach of banning hate speech that has been adopted by many other 
democracies and is advocated by Waldron and MacKinnon. The 
prohibitionist approach does not adequately respect the equal autonomy of 
citizens. However, my view also differs from neutralists, such as Martin 
Redish, who interpret free speech as grounded in humility about the 
Constitution’s own values. I have instead offered a substantive value-based 
justification for the doctrine of viewpoint neutrality in rights against 
coercion. The underlying values of the First Amendment, the reasons for 
rights, are based on the non-neutral values of free and equal citizenship. 
Although I have defended viewpoint neutrality in rights against coercion, I 
have rejected viewpoint neutrality in state speech. The state should promote 
the values of freedom and equality for all citizens in its expressive 
capacities as a speaker, educator, and spender. My approach accepts the 
notion that the Court should be humble when it comes to imposing 
 
101 See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 6; WALDRON, supra note 5. 
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constitutional values through coercion but adds that the Court should also 
recognize the importance of an active role for the state in advancing the 
values of free and equal citizenship when it employs democratic 
persuasion. 
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